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Abstract
One of them is the need to satisfy the conditions of full membership in the Economic and
Monetary Union (”EMU”) and the adoption of the Euro as their official currency. The Article then
sets out the procedure to join the system for coordinating national currency exchange rates to the
Euro, called the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (”ERM II”) and presents the economic situation in
the new Member States in light of the convergence criteria. This gave birth to the so-called Pre-
Accession Fiscal Surveillance Procedure (”PFSP”), which aims to prepare the new Member States
for participation in the multilateral surveillance and economic policy coordination procedures cur-
rently in place in the EU as part of EMU. The Member States which satisfied the convergence
criteria and entered the final stage of EMU, thus joining the centralized monetary policy of ECB
and accepting the Euro as their currency, obviously should continue relatively strict budgetary
policies and continue to avoid excessive deficits. Hence, it is extremely doubtful whether new
Member States will be allowed to adopt the Euro after participation of fewer than two years in
ERM II. No mention is made of real convergence as a criterion for entry into the third stage of
EMU and adoption of the Euro.
LL.M. PERSPECTIVE
WHAT CHALLENGES DO THE CENTRAL
EUROPEAN AND MEDITERRANEAN STATES
FACE IN TRYING TO JOIN THE THIRD
STAGE OF EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION?
Andrej Fatur*
INTRODUCTION
Following the ratification of the Treaty of Accession,' signed
in Athens in April 2003, ten Central European and Mediterra-
nean States2 joined the European Union ("EU") on May 1, 2004.
This event undoubtedly represents one of the most striking and
far-reaching achievements in the history of both the new Mem-
ber States and of EU. Less than fifteen years ago, all new Mem-
ber States' regimes (except Cyprus and Malta) were based on
centrally-planned economic and socialist values. In order to
* Dean Acheson stagiaire at the European Court of Justice, Luxembourg starting
January 2005; LL.M. in International Trade and Business Law, Fordham University
School of Law, 2004; M.Sc. in Commercial Law, University of Ljubljana School of Law,
2000; LL.B., University of Ljubljana School of Law, 1997; worked as senior associate
attorney in corporate law firm Lukancic in Ljubljana, Slovenia; admitted to the Slove-
nian Bar, 2001. The author would like to thank Professor Roger Goebel for his insight
and suggestions. The author greatly appreciates the dedication of the editors and staff
of the Fordham International Law Journal in bringing this Article to publication. Finally,
he would like to extend his thanks to his parents for their unconditional support in
pursuit of his studies.
1. Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French
Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of
Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland (Member States of the European Union), and the Czech Republic, the Repub-
lic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania,
the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic
of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Concerning the Accession of the Czech Republic, the
Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of
Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the
Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union, O.J. L 236,
(2003) [hereinafter Treaty of Accession].
2. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. See id.
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fully comply with the strict regulation of the integration process
set forth by EU, the new Member States had to make tough (and
often extremely unpopular) reforms to transform their countries
into modern democracies and functioning market economies.3
Nevertheless, certain undeniably difficult challenges still lie
ahead. One of them is the need to satisfy the conditions of full
membership in the Economic and Monetary Union ("EMU")
and the adoption of the Euro as their official currency. In accor-
dance with the provisions of the E.C. Treaty4 and the Athens
Treaty of Accession,5 new Member States participate in EMU
from the date of accession as a Member State, though in a spe-
cial form.
This Article presents the challenges that the new Member
States face in trying to join the final stage of EMU. Taking into
consideration the complexity and broad implications of this pro-
cess, this examination is limited to legal and selected economic
issues.
This Article has four main components. First, it outlines the
general features of EMU and its institutional structure. Next,
this Article presents the measures already taken by new Member
States with regard to the free movement of capital and EMU,
accompanied by a review of the existing legal framework of EMU
and a discussion on the policy implications for the new Member
3. See Roger J. Goebel, Joining the European Union: The Accession Procedure for the
Central European and Mediterranean States, 1 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 15, 37-45 (2004)
[hereinafter Goebel, Joining the European Union] (outlining reforms carried out by new
Member States to meet economic standards required for accession); see also Copenha-
gen European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, 26 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 12-16
(1993) [hereinafter Copenhagen European Council] (declaring that all of the Central
European Nations that entered into Europe Agreements and might ultimately join the
European Union ("EU"), must satisfy three pre-conditions, known as the "Copenhagen
Criteria": 1) stable institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, with full
respect for basic human rights and the protection of minorities; 2) a functional market
Economy, with free market competition, and the ability to "cope with competitive pres-
sure and market forces within the Union;" and 3) the ability and the administrative
infrastructure necessary to fulfill all of the obligations of membership, including that in
the Economic and Monetary Union).
4. Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, art.
122, O.J. C 325/33, 37 I.L.M. 79, incorporating changes made by Treaty of Nice amend-
ing the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communi-
ties and certain related acts, Feb. 26, 2001, O.J. C 80/1 (2001) (amending Treaty on
European Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the E.C. ("E.C. Treaty"), Treaty establish-
ing the European Coal Steel Community ("ECSC"), and Treaty establishing the
Euratom and renumbering articles of TEU and E.C. Treaty) [hereinafter E.C. Treaty].
5. Treaty of Accession, supra note 1, art. 4, O.J. L 236.
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States after joining EU. The analysis is focused on the Treaty-
based conditions for attaining the final stage of EMU, commonly
called the convergence criteria, their legal basis, and possible ap-
plication within the new Member States.
The Article then sets out the procedure to join the system
for coordinating national currency exchange rates to the Euro,
called the Exchange Rate Mechanism II ("ERM II") and presents
the economic situation in the new Member States in light of the
convergence criteria. In its fourth and final part, this Article dis-
cusses the necessary measures to be adopted by the new Member
States and sketches the formal procedure to join the third stage
of EMU. Finally, the Article provides an estimate of the time
schedule for fulfillment of the convergence criteria in the new
Member States.
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC AND
MONETARY UNION ("EMU")
A. Institutional Structure of EMU6
1. General
EMU is a part of the European Community ("E.C." or
"Community"). The EMU Treaty provisions were added by the
Treaty of Maastricht.7 As in the E.C. generally, the ultimate
center for policy-making is the European Council, which pro-
vides for the policy guidelines of EMU.' The European Council
is composed of the heads of state or government of each EU
6. For a detailed analysis of EMU provisions in the E.C. Treaty, see RENE SMITS,
THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK - INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS (1997); see also Jorn Pipkorn,
Legal Arrangements in the Treaty of Maastricht for the Effectiveness of the Economic and
Monetary Union, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 263 (1994).
7. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, as amended by Single European Act,
O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA]). The TEU, adopted as
part of the Treaty of Maastricht, was signed at Maastricht, the Netherlands, on February
7, 1992, and entered into force on November 1, 1993. See id.
8. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 8, O.J. C 325/33. The Treaty provides that:
A European System of Central Banks ["ESCB"] ... and a European Central
Bank ["ECB"] ... shall be established in accordance with the procedures laid
down in this Treaty; they shall act within the limits of the powers conferred
upon them by this Treaty and by the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB ...
annexed thereto.
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Member State, along with the President of the Commission.9 It
meets, on average, two to three times per year.'" The European
Council is an extremely powerful and influential body in EU,
though it holds no direct institutional or legislative power."
The Council of Ministers ("Council"), which represents the
Member States at the ministerial level, plays the central legisla-
tive role in EMU. The Council reports to the European Council
to receive guidance on major policy issues.12 The Council also
either informs or consults the European Parliament as required
by specific Treaty provisions.'" The Council adopts the relevant
legislation or decisions in this field, either by a unanimous or
qualified majority vote, depending on the relevant Treaty provi-
sion.
The European Commission ("Commission"), the central ad-
ministrative body in the E.C., is also generally responsible for
initiating E.C. legislation. 4 In the EMU sector of the Commu-
nity, the Commission is generally charged with proposing poli-
cies or recommendations to the Council, assisting the Council in
the surveillance of economic activities of the Member States, and
monitoring implementation of EMU measures.
Pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty, an Economic and Finan-
cial Committee ("EFC"), 1" with advisory status, was set up to re-
view the monetary and financial situations of the Member States
and Community, the general payments system of the Member
States, and to report thereon to the Council and the Commis-
sion. EFC is also empowered to deliver opinions at the request
of the Council, the Commission, or on its own initiative, for sub-
mission to those institutions. It contributes to the work of the
Council regarding capital movements, government deficits, com-
9. See, e.g., GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION
LAw 40-42 (2002).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 99(2), 99(4), 100, 104(11), 105(6), 106(2),
107(6), 114(3), 117(1), 121(2), O.J. C 325/33. The assent of the European Parliament
is required only for institutional changes. See id. art. 107(5).
14. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 9, at 42-44.
15. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 114(1), O.J. C 325/33. At the start of the third
stage of EMU, the Economic and Financial Committee ("EFC") replaced the Monetary
Committee which was set up to promote coordination of the policies of the Member
States to the full extent needed for the functioning of the internal market and had
similar tasks later to the EFC. See id.
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mitments of public authorities, access to financial institutions
and the guidelines for the economic policies of the Member
States. 6 EFC consists of two committee members representing
each Member State, the Commission, and the European Central
Bank ("ECB"), which will be discussed below.17
2. The European Monetary Institute, European Central Bank
and the European System of Central Banks
The first preparatory stage in EMU (not even described in
the Maastricht Treaty), began with the start of full free move-
ment of capital in 199118 and essentially consisted of intergov-
ernmental cooperation and early planning.19 The Maastricht
Treaty20 prescribed the start of a second stage in January 1,
1994.2 During the second stage, economic coordination was in-
tensified and each Member State was supposed to try achieving
the convergence criteria22 to join the final stage.
The European Monetary Institute ("EMI") 23 took up its du-
ties at the start of the second stage of EMU. 24 It had a legal
function and was directed by a Council consisting of a Presi-
dent 25 and the Governors of the individual National Central
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See, e.g., Juan Luis Milldn Pereira, Economic Restructuring and the European Mone-
tary Union, 9 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 45, 53-54 (2001) (discussing European
Monetary System, the predecessor of EMU, and its successful establishment of a stable,
but adjustable exchange rate system); Dr. Dieter Kugelmann, The Maastricht Treaty and
the Design of a European Federal State, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 335, 340 (1994) (noting
that first stage fixed the exchange rates of European currencies in relation to one an-
other).
19. See Pereira, supra note 18, at 53-55 (describing first stage of EMU and its prede-
cessor and their reliance on governmental cooperation).
20. See TEU, supra note 7, OJ. C 224/1.
21. See Kugelmann, supra note 18, at 340 (noting that Treaty of Maastricht called
for commencement of second stage on January 1, 1994).
22. See infra notes 58-66, 151-166 and accompanying text (discussing convergence
criteria).
23. See id. art. 117. The European Monetary Institute ("EMI") replaced the Com-
mittee of Governors of NCBs and European Monetary Cooperation Fund which were
dissolved at the start of the second stage of EMU. See id.
24. For more detailed description of the composition, role and functions of EMI,
see Pipkorn, supra note 6, at 282-84 and SMITS, supra note 6, at 49-51.
25. The President was appointed by common accord of the governments of the
Member States at the level of Heads of State or Government, on a recommendation
from the Council of EMI, and after consulting the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil of Ministers ("Council"). See SMITS, supra note 6, at 49-51.
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Banks ("NCBs"), one of whom was also appointed Vice-President
by the Council. Its statute is laid down in a Protocol annexed to
the E.C. Treaty. Unlike the third stage of EMU, monetary policy
in the second stage expressly remained in the hands of NCBs.2 6
EMI's role and tasks, set forth in Article 117(2) and (3), were
principally to comprise the monetary policies of the Member
States.2 7 EMI also prepared legislation, policies, and studies de-
signed to ensure smooth transition to the third stage of EMU, in
which the autonomous ECB and European System of Central
Banks ("ESCB") would conduct a unified monetary policy.28
ESCB29 commenced the control of monetary policy at the
start of the third stage of EMU 30 in January 1999 for those States
that joined in that final stage. ESCB is composed of the ECB
and all NCBs of Member States, including those which do not
participate in the final stage of EMU. 1 ECB, at the core of
ESCB, has a legal personality. 32 ECB's central operational unit is
the Governing Council of ECB, which consists of the six mem-
bers of the ECB's Executive Board together with one governor
each from those NCBs whose countries have joined the final
stage of EMU.33 The Executive Board, responsible for the day-
to-day work of the ECB, comprises the President, the Vice-Presi-
dent and four other Members, appointed for eight year terms by
the Member States which have joined the final stage of EMU. 4
26. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 117(2) & (4), O.J. C 325/33.
27. In the exercise of its coordinating tasks EMI was entitled to formulate or sub-
mit opinions and recommendations in the field of monetary and exchange-rate policy
in the second stage of EMU. See id. art. 117(4).
28. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACrMTIES OF THE EURO-
PEAN UNION 1994 40-41 (1994); see also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON
THE AcrVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 1995 1 70-75 (1995); EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 1996 84-85 (1996).
29. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 8, O.J. C 325/33; see also Roger Goebel, Euro-
pean Economic and Monetary Union: Will EMU Ever Fly? 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 250, 276-85
(1998) [hereinafter Goebel, Will EMU Ever Fly?].
30. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 123, O.J. C 325/33.
31. See id. art. 107(1).
32. See id. art. 107(2). Legal personality means that an organization has its own
legal identity under international law, i.e., the ability to contract, own property, to sue
and be sued, employ, and bear liability. See, e.g., Alexander Gillespie, Iceland's Reservation
at the International Whaling Commission, 14 EUR. J. INTr'L L. 977, 995 (2004). The NCBs
retain their own legal personality under national law.
33. See id. arts. 107(3) & 112(1).
34. See id. art. 112(2). They are appointed from among persons of recognized
standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters by common ac-
cord of the governments of the Member States at the level of Heads of State or Govern-
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For the purpose of coordination, the President of the Council
and a Member of the Commission may attend meetings of the
Governing Council in a non-voting capacity.3 5 In parallel, the
President of the ECB can participate in Council meetings when
the Council is discussing matters relating to the objectives and
tasks of the ESCB. 6
In accordance with Article 108 of the E.C. Treaty, the ESCB,
ECB and NCBs are completely independent in their decision-
making and cannot seek or accept advice from any other E.C.
institution or Member State. 7 The primary objective of ESCB is
set out in Article 105(1) which states:
The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price
stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability,
the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the
Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of
the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2.
The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an
open market economy with free competition, favoring an effi-
cient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the
principles set out in Article 4.
Article 105(2) sets out the basic tasks of ESCB: to define
and implement the monetary policy of the Community; to con-
duct foreign-exchange operations; to hold and manage the offi-
cial foreign reserves of the Member States; and to promote the
smooth operation of payment systems. The Treaty also confers
on ECB another crucial power, namely the "exclusive right to
authorize the issue of banknotes within the Community." 8 Both
ECB and NCBs may issue such notes, the "only such notes to
have the status of legal tender within the Community."39 Finally,
ECB has also been granted a substantial degree of regulatory
power.40
ment, on a recommendation from the Council, after it has consulted the European
Parliament and the Governing Council of the ECB.
35. See id. art. 113(1).
36. See id. art. 113(2).
37. See id. art. 107.
38. See id. art. 106(1).
39. See id.
40. The European System of Central Banks ("ESCB") has the power to make regu-
lations to the extent necessary to implement the tasks defined in Article 3(1), Articles
19(1), 22, and 25.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and in cases which shall be laid down in
the acts of the Council referred to in Article 107(6) of the E.C. Treaty. See id. art. 110.
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B. Basic Framework of EMU
1. Brief Historical Background
The roots of EMU trace as far back as the first E.C. Treaty,
which provided for the coordination of the economic and mone-
tary policies, but rather summarily.4 The original Article 105(2)
of the E.C. Treaty, as early as 1958, established Monetary Com-
mittee to review the monetary and financial situations of the
Member States.4 2 The first step towards significant monetary
union began in 19704" with the Werner Report.4 4 Based upon
this Report, the Council adopted Regulation 907/7315 establish-
ing the European Monetary Cooperation Fund ("EMCF") to
provide short-term monetary support and facilitate concerted
monetary action. Most Member States entered a system to re-
duce exchange rate fluctuations to a narrow band, popularly
called "the snake."
The next significant development in this area was the Euro-
pean Monetary System ("EMS"), 46 which actually became the ini-
tial stage of EMU. EMS had three basic components:4 7 (1) an
artificial currency, the ECU; (2) exchange rates which are per-
mitted to fluctuate only in a narrow band;4" and (3) a system of
41. See id. arts. 3 (g), 103-16 (as originally ordered and numbered).
42. See Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11, art. 105(2) [hereinafter E.E.C. Treaty].
43. Council Decision of 6 Mar. 1970, O.J. L 59/44 (1970) O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. Se-
ries II, Vol. X, at 11 (Council decision to set up a working group chaired by Professor
Werner).
44. See Report on the Realization by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union, 3
E.C. BULL. no. 11 (1970). The Werner Report proposed a system of irreversible convert-
ibility of national currencies, free from fluctuation, regulated by a Community system of
central banks modeled after the Federal Reserve. The Report's proposal that the EEC
Treaty be amended in order to achieve monetary union, did not, of course, result in
any action. See Goebel, WilEMUEver ly?, supra note 29, at 257. For further details on
the Werner Report and Community action to implement it, see SMITS, SUpra note 6, at
15-19.
45. See Council Regulation of 3 April 1973, O.J. L 907/73 2 (1973) (establishing a
European Monetary Cooperation Fund).
46. See 11 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 17-18 (1978).
47. See Goebel, Will EMU Ever Fly?, supra note 29, at 259-60. For a detailed descrip-
tion of EMS, see European Commission, The EMS: Ten Years of Progress in European
Monetary Cooperation 3 E.C. OFF'L PUB. Or 3 (1989).
48. This system for the stabilization of exchange rates between the currencies of
the Member States was called the Exchange Rate Mechanism ("ERM"). Fluctuation
margins of plus or minus 2.25% were established around exchange rates, but Member
States with weaker currencies might opt for a margin up to ± 6% on the understanding
that these margins would be reduced gradually.
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credit and loan reserves to stabilize Member States' currencies in
times of crisis.
C. The Maastricht Treaty Provisions on EMU
EMU consists of the coordination of Member State eco-
nomic policies and the transfer of monetary policy control to
ESCB and ECB, together with the introduction of a single cur-
rency, the Euro. The Intergovernmental Conference ("IGC")
which dealt with EMU issues concluded its deliberations in Maas-
tricht in December 1991." 9 According to Professor Roger Goe-
bel,5" no aspect of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union
("TEU") 51 is of greater practical importance than the provisions
on EMU. Article 2 of the TEU lists creation of an economic and
monetary union and a single currency as among the principal
objectives of EU.5 2 In addition, the new Article 4 of the E.C.
Treaty states that the Community activities shall include the
adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close co-
ordination of Member States' economic policies, on the internal
market and on the definition of common objectives, and which
is conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market
economy with free competition.5 1 Concurrently with these prin-
ciples, there shall be the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates
leading to the introduction of a single currency (the Euro) and
the definition and conduct of a single monetary policy and ex-
change-rate policy. The primary objective of monetary policy
and exchange-rate policy is to maintain price stability. In order
to make this possible, an immense program for achieving EMU
was devised. The E.C. Treaty provides that EMU is to be
achieved in three stages.
The first stage, which started on July 1, 1990,54 consisted es-
sentially of an attempt at greater convergence of the national
economies, free movement of capital and payments among
Member States and between Member States and Nations outside
49. See, e.g., Roger Goebel, The European Union in Transition: The Treaty of Nice in
Effect, Enlargement in Sight: A Constitution in Doubt, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 455, 460
(2004).
50. See Goebel, Will EMU Ever Fly?, supra note 29, at 271.
51. See TEU, supra note 7, 0.J. C 224/1.
52. See id. art. 2.
53. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 4, 0J. C 325/33.
54. Started July 1, 1990 and ended on December 31, 1993.
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EU, and the strengthening of the cooperation between NCBs.
Furthermore, State overdraft facilities with its NCB and privi-
leged access of financial institutions to its NCB were abolished.55
The Council was to assess the progress made with regard to eco-
nomic and monetary convergence; in particular, with regard to
price stability, sound public finances, and the progress made
with implementing Community law concerning the internal mar-
ket.56 The Member States had to start the process leading to
independence of their central banks and to avoid excessive defi-
cit.
57
The second stage, which ran from January 1, 1994 to De-
cember 31, 1998,58 began with the creation of EMI, which was
replaced five years later at the beginning of the third stage by
ECB. During the second stage, the Member States were obliged
to make every effort to meet convergence of the economic and
monetary policies of the Member States (to ensure stability of
prices and sound public finances), the so-called convergence cri-
teria. The most important decision to be made in 1998 at the
end of the second stage of EMU was which Member States could
participate in the third stage of EMU, and consequently, in the
single currency system.
Whether the Member States which joined the Euro-area on
January 1, 1999, actually fulfilled the convergence criteria neces-
sary to join the third stage of EMU, is somewhat debatable. Ac-
cording to some commentators, the relatively vague provisions
on convergence criteria, discretionary powers of the decision-
making bodies, and strong political imperatives to achieve a sin-
gle currency resulted in allowing some Member States to join the
third stage of EMU that would not have qualified if the conver-
gence criteria had been strictly applied.59
With the commencement of the third stage on January 1,
1999,6" the exchange rates were irrevocably fixed, the Euro was
introduced as a virtual currency on the foreign-exchange mar-
55. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 101(1) & (2), O.J. C 325/33.
56. See id. art. 116(2).
57. See id. art. 108.
58. See id. art. 116.
59. See, e.g., Paul Beaumont & Neil Walker, The Euro and European Legal Order, in
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE SINGLE CURRENCY 169, 174-75 (Paul Beaumont & Neil Walker
eds., 1999); Peter B. Kenen, The Transition to EMU, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 359 (1998).
60. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 121, O.J. C 325/33.
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kets and for electronic payments, followed by the introduction of
Euro notes and coins startingJanuary 1, 2002. In the third stage,
the participating Member States no longer decide or implement
their own monetary policies. This role is transferred to ESCB.
II. THE "INS" AND THE "OUTS" - STATUS OF THE NEW
MEMBER STATES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF EMU
AFFER JOINING THE EU
A. Brief Overview of the Measures Already Taken by the
New Member States
Although a wide range of very important legislative and pol-
icy actions concerning the free movement of capital and EMU
must still be adopted by the new Member States, considerable
efforts and reforms have already been undertaken. A series of
Europe Agreements provide the initial legal framework for the
measures taken by new Member States before accession to EU.6 1
The provisions of these Europe Agreements provide for the
gradual liberalization of current payments and movement of
capital, investment promotion and protection, as well as eco-
nomic and financial cooperation. 62 Since then, the Association
61. Association Agreements were entered into by the European Community and
each of the new Member States. The Europe Agreements with Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, and Poland were signed on December 16, 1991. See 24 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 95-96
(1991). The Europe Agreement with Romania was signed on February 1, 1993. See 26
E.C. BULL., no. 1/2, at 69 (1993). The Europe Agreement with Bulgaria was signed on
March 8, 1993. See 26 E.C. BULL., no. 3, at 58 (1993). The Agreement with Czechoslova-
kia was replaced by separate Agreements with the Czech Republic and the Slovak Re-
public on October 4, 1993. See 26 E.C. BULL., no. 10, at 70-71 (1993). The Council
approved negotiations with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on November 28, 1994. See
E.U. BULL., no. 11, at 77 (1994).
Apart from Cyprus and Malta which entered into their Association Agreements in
1971 and 1973, respectively, all other new Member States, i.e., Central European Coun-
tries, entered into the Association Agreements in the course of the 1990s. These agree-
ments, also known as "Europe Agreements," are much more comprehensive than past
European Community association agreements and were, due to their nature, also the
basis for the beginning of the European Eastward Enlargement. See Roger J. Goebel,
The European Union Grows, 18 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 1092, 1176-78 (1995); see also Pre-
Accession Strategy, available at http://Europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/index.
htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).
62. See The Europe Agreements: Interactive Comparison, available at http://www.
asser.nl/hee/index.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2004); see also HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN EN-
LARGEMENT, A COMMENTARY ON THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS, KLUWER INTERNATIONAL
(Andrea Ott & Kirstyn Inglis eds., 2002), available at http://www.asser.nl/hee.htm (last
visited Oct. 8, 2004).
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Councils6 3 have been keeping the transition process on track by
regularly examining the accomplishments of the economic re-
form in the new Member States.6 4
The real push towards transition came with the beginning
of the negotiation procedure for accession to EU. In June 1993,
the Copenhagen European Council concluded that membership
requires that an "accession country... have the ability to take on
the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims
of political, economic and monetary union."65 The new Mem-
ber States focused their efforts on the final goal - compliance
with the acquis communautaire.6 6 Apart from recognizing their
status as Member State with derogation within the meaning of
Article 122 of the E.C. Treaty no additional transitional mea-
sures were granted to the new Member States in the area of
63. Association Councils represent the institutional framework of the Europe
Agreements. Association Councils are defined under Title IX, Institutional, General
and Final Provisions of each Europe Agreement. See The Europe Agreements: Interac-
tive Comparison, available at http://www.asser.nl/hee/index.htm (last visited Oct. 8,
2004); see also HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT, A COMMENTARY ON THE ENLARGE-
MENT PROCESS, KLUWER INTERNATIONAL (Andrea Ott & Kirstyn Inglis eds., 2002), availa-
ble at http://www.asser.nl/hee.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2004). Each Europe Agreement
has its own Association Council. The Association Councils supervise the implementa-
tion of the Europe Agreements and examine any major issues arising within its frame-
work and any other bilateral or international issues of mutual interest. They meet at
the ministerial level once a year and when circumstances require. The Association
Councils consist of the members of the Council and members of the Commission, on
the one hand, and of members appointed by the government of individual candidate
countries, on the other.
64. Willem Duisenberg, EU Enlargement, Some Views From the ECB, Speech at
the Bank of Greece in Athens, Greece, Oct. 15, 1999, at 7 (1999), available at, http://
www.ecb.int/press/key/date/ 1999/html/sp991015.en.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
65. See Copenhagen European Council, supra note 3.
66. During the pre-accession phase, the new Member States carried out the eco-
nomic reforms and policies needed to fulfill the economic criteria set by the European
Council in Copenhagen in June 1993. They also adopted the required EMU related
legislation to become a Member State with derogation. These are:
- Completion of the orderly liberalization of capital movements (Article 56,
E.C. Treaty);
- Prohibition of any direct public sector financing by the central bank (Article
101, E.C. Treaty) and of privileged access of the public sector to financial
institutions (Article 102, E.C. Treaty);
- Alignment of the national central bank statutes with the Treaty, including
the independence of the monetary authorities (Articles 108 and 109, E.C.
Treaty).
For a comprehensive review of the principle of acquis communautarie, see Goebel, Joining
the European Union, supra note 3, at 33-36.
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EMU by the Athens Treaty of Accession.6 7
Nevertheless, probably the most important framework for
cooperation in the area of EMU from a practical point of view
was provided by the Accession Partnerships.68 At its meeting in
Luxembourg in December 1997, the European Council decided
that Accession Partnerships would be the key feature of the en-
hanced pre-accession strategy, mobilizing all forms of assistance
to the new Member States within a single framework. One of the
economic priorities of the Accession Partnerships was the estab-
lishment of an annual fiscal surveillance for the new Member
States. This gave birth to the so-called Pre-Accession Fiscal Sur-
veillance Procedure ("PFSP"),69 which aims to prepare the new
Member States for participation in the multilateral surveillance
and economic policy coordination procedures currently in place
in the EU as part of EMU. PFSP has three main components -
the Fiscal Notification, 7° the Pre-Accession Economic Program
("PEP") 7' and the Multilateral Dialogue. 72 PEPs are updated an-
67. See Treaty of Accession, supra note 1, art. 4, O.J. L 236.
68. See Conclusion of the European Council on the enhanced pre-accession strat-
egy, European Union Enlargement, Luxemburg, E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 3 (1997). In this
manner, the Community targets its assistance towards the specific needs of each candi-
date country so as to provide support for overcoming particular problems with a view to
accession. See Council Regulation No. 622/98, O.J. L 85 (1998) (on assistance to the
applicant States in the framework of the pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the
establishment of Accession Partnerships).
69. See European Commission, Directorate General, Economic and Financial Af-
fairs, The Macroeconomic Policy Framework for EU Membership and Euro-area Participation - the
Role of Budgetary Policy, Presented at Conference on EU Accession - Developing Fiscal
Policy Frameworks for Sustainable Growth 7-8 (2002), available at http://Europa.eu.
int/comm/economyfinance/events/2002/brussel2/macro-en.pdf (last visited Oct. 8,
2004) [hereinafter European Commission, Macroeconomic Policy Framework].
70. The first annual notification of debt and deficit levels was submitted by all the
new Member States to DG ECFIN by April 1, 2001. The format of the notification will
be identical to that which the Member States currently undertake twice a year. See Euro-
pean Commission, Directorate General for Economic and Social Affairs, European Econ-
omy, Enlargement Papers No. 17, Main Results of the April 2003 Fiscal Notifications Presented
By the New Member States 3 (2003), available at http://Europa.eu.int/comm/economy_
finance/publications/enlargement-papers/elpl7_en.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).
71. Pre-Accession Economic Programs have two objectives. First, to outline the me-
dium-term policy framework, including public finance objectives and structural reform
priorities needed for EU accession. Second, they offer an opportunity to develop the
institutional and analytical capacity necessary to participate in EMU with derogation
from the adoption of the Euro upon accession, particularly in the areas of multilateral
surveillance and coordination of economic policies.
72. See Press Release, ECOFIN Council, 2,312th Council Meeting in Brussels,
Belgium (2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer-
ence=EolPRES/00/453&format=HTML&aged=l &language=EN&guiLanguage=EN
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nually and should be regarded as early precursors of the Conver-
gence and Stability Programs which the Member States were
obliged to prepare in 1998 and which have been updated on an
annual basis.73
B. EMU - Legal Framezwork and Policy Implication for the
New Member States
It was clear long before the conclusion of the negotiation
procedure that new Member States would not be able to "opt
out"7 4 of EMU as Denmark75 and the United Kingdom7 6 had
done. 7 Thus, Article 4 of the Athens Treaty of Accession pro-
vides that "each of the new Member States shall participate in
(last visited Oct. 16, 2004). ECOFIN Multilateral dialogue was requested by the
ECOFIN Council in order to establish a regular in-depth dialogue between new Mem-
ber States and Member States, at various levels. See id. To this end, members of the EFC
and their counterparts from the new Member States meet to discuss the result of the
pre-accession procedure. See id. These high level meetings also serve to prepare the
economic dialogue at ministerial level. See European Commission, Macroeconomic Policy
Framework, supra note 69, at 8.
73. See Council Regulation No. 1466/97, O.J. L 209/1 (1997) (on the strengthen-
ing of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of
economic policies) [hereinafter Economic Surveillance Regulation].
74. Although no official "opt out" clause was granted to Sweden, it never joined
the third stage of EMU. While Sweden would probably satisfy the convergence criteria,
Sweden never made its central bank independent and technically does not satisfy a
Treaty-based criterion for joining. The September 2003 referendum on joining the
third stage of EMU was unsuccessful despite the huge effort of Swedish government. At
present, it appears that the other Member States will acquiesce in Sweden's failure to
take the necessary measure to join the third stage. From the new Member States' Arti-
cle, the Swedish precedent might be important in case a candidate country would not
want to adopt the Euro, although fulfilling the nominal convergence criteria and attain
the sustainable real convergence. While undoubtedly an interesting theoretical ques-
tion, it seems that it will not have a major influence on the situations of most new
Member States, because their backgrounds are completely different from Sweden's.
Due to their histories of socialistic economies and unstable currencies, they are already
declaring their aspirations to adopt the Euro as quickly as possible. See Goebel, Will
EMU Ever Fly?, supra note 29, at 307.
75. See CHIARA ZILIOLI & MARTIN SELMAYER, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL
BANK 137-42 (2001); see also SMITS, supra note 6, at 137-38.
76. See TEU, supra note 51, O.J. C 224/1, Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating
to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, O.J. C 191 (1992).
77. See Duisenberg, supra note 64, at 9-10 (stating "it has been decided that no
'opt-out' clauses, such as those negotiated by the United kingdom and Denmark, shall
be available to new Member States"); see also Christian Noyer, Some ECB Views on the
Accession Process, Speech on the Occasion of The Central and Eastern European Issu-
ers and Investors Forum, Vienna, AustriaJan. 17, 2001, at 4 (2001), available at http://
www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2001/html/spO10117.en.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2004)
(stating "[t]he new entrants will, as far as EMU is concerned, have the status of 'Mem-
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Economic and Monetary Union from the date of accession as a
Member State with a derogation within the meaning of Article
122 of the E.C. Treaty.
78
The third stage of EMU commenced on January 1, 1999.
71
The new Member States, upon accession, assumed the rights and
obligations which exist for States during the third stage.80 Thus,
the new Member States have the status of Member States with a
derogation, as defined by Article 122,81 while the date of their
actual adoption of the Euro and entry into ECB monetary con-
trol will depend on the legal and economic convergence of the
individual candidate States.82
Their individual economic policies then become a matter of
common concern and are subject to economic policy coordina-
tion" and multilateral surveillance procedures.8 4 The main in-
struments for coordination are the Broad Economic Policy
ber State with derogation.' No 'opt-out' clauses will be available for the future new
[M]embers").
78. See Treaty of Accession, supra note 1, art. 4, OJ. L 236.
79. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 121(4), OJ. C 325/33.
80. See ZILIoLI & SELMAYER, supra note 75, at 144 (stating that "[a] new [M]ember
[S] tate therefore will accede automatically to the third stage. This follows from Article
121 (4), first sentence, EC in conjunction with [P]rotocol No. 24 on the transition to
the third stage of the economic and monetary union, where is laid down that on Janu-
ary 1, 1999 'the Community' moved to Stage Three: thus all Member [S]tates, except
where Community law states otherwise, as is the case in the Danish and UK Protocols").
For a different view, that the Member States with a derogation do not participate in
Stage Three, see RALPH MEHNER-MELAND, CENTRAL BANK TO EUROPEAN UNION 41
(1995).
81. For Member States with a derogation, Articles 104(9) & (11), Articles 105(1)-
(5), Article 106, Article 110, Article 111, and Article 112(2) (b) of the E.C. Treaty do not
apply. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, O.J. C 325/33. The exclusion of such a Member
State and its national central bank from rights and obligations within the ESCB is laid
down in chapter IX of the Statute of the ESCB. See id., Protocol on the Statute of the
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, O.J. C 191/68,
at ch. 9 (1992) [hereinafter Statute of the ESCB and ECB]. For the Member States with
derogation, Articles 119 and 120 of the E.C. Treaty still apply. See E.C. Treaty, supra note
4, arts. 119-20, O.J. C 325/33.
82. Duisenberg distinguishes three stages with different sets of criteria before the
new Member States will be able to become participating Member States: EU member-
ship which requires implementation of EMU - related acquis; then on date of accession
they will join EMU with the status of "countries with a derogation" with commitment to
eventual adoption of the Euro; finally, once they achieve a sufficient degree of conver-
gence, they are expected to participate in ERM II. See Duisenberg, supra note 64, at 10.
Following this, when the Maastricht convergence criteria are met, the new Member
States will adopt the Euro and become full participants of EMU. See id.
83. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 99, 0J. C 325/33.
84. See Economic Surveillance Regulation, supra note 73, 0.J. L 209/1.
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Guidelines ("BEPG") s5 and Stability and Growth Pact ("SGP").86
Though the new Member States do not participate in the Mone-
tary Union immediately after accession, participation in the
Euro-area is the ultimate goal and obligation of new Member
States."7 In order to join the third stage and become full mem-
bers of EMU, the new Member States will first have to join Ex-
change Rate Mechanism II ("ERM II")" s and then fulfill the con-
vergence criteria.8"
85. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 99(2), O.J. C 325/33.
86. The Stability and Growth Pact ("SGP") sets out rules for the EU, establishing a
framework within which Member States have agreed to coordinate their fiscal policies.
While monetary policy in the Euro-area has been unified and is now conducted by the
European Central Bank ("ECB"), fiscal policy remains a matter for national govern-
ments. See HOUSE OF LosS, SELECT COMMITrEE ON EUROPEAN UNION, THIRTEENTH RE-
PORT, 2003, Cmnd. 668, at 8. The fiscal policies of the Member States are, however,
subject to the constraints of the SGP. See id. Whether or not a Member State has
adopted the Euro, Member States are free to structure the expenditure and the reve-
nue side of their budgets according to their own national preferences. See id. Member
States have agreed to a SGP framework for the coordination of fiscal policy, with a view
to maintaining sound public finances. See id.
87. See 26 E.C. BULL., supra note 3, at 12-16.
88. Council Resolution of 17June 1997, o.J. C 236 (1997) (on the establishment
of an exchange-rate mechanism in the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union
and stating that "[w]ith the start of the third stage of economic and monetary union,
the European Monetary System will be replaced by the exchange-rate mechanism as
defined in this Resolution .... The exchange-rate mechanism will link currencies of
Member States outside the Euro-area to the Euro").
The basic features of the Exchange Rate Mechanism II ("ERM II") are as follows:
- membership in ERM II is open only to EU members;
- central rates and fluctuation bands of participating countries' currencies
against the Euro are set by common procedure (involving Finance Ministers,
European Central Bank ("ECB") and the National Central Banks ("NCBs"),
governors and the European Commission);
- the standard fluctuation band is ± 15%, while not excluding the possibility of
setting a narrower band;
- intervention support of the ECB to the NCBs is automatic at the margins of
the band (marginal interventions); any interventions within the band (intra-
marginal interventions) need not be (but may be) supported by the ECB;
- the ECB and NCBs have a formal right to suspend intervention should the
price stability objective be jeopardized; and
- realignments of central parity are made by the common procedure, which
both the ECB and the Member States have the right to initiate.
See id.
89. In order to adopt the Euro, Member States have to achieve a high degree of
sustainable economic convergence which means a low inflation rate, healthy public fi-
nances, low level of interest rates and stable exchange rates. The economic strength of
Member States is assessed on the basis of the fulfillment of the "Maastricht convergence
criteria" set out in Article 121 of the E.C. Treaty. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 121,
O.J. C 325/33. The criteria entail:
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In immediately broader terms, this implies that the eco-
nomic union provisions apply to them in full,9" and that in the
area of monetary union, they are subject to the provisions which
applied during the second stage.9 Therefore, new Member
States shall, until official adoption of the Euro, keep their na-
tional currencies, retain their power over monetary policies and
foreign currency reserves and, subject to requirements pre-
scribed in Article 124 of the E.C. Treaty, also continue to be
competent in exchange-rate matters.
Although the new Member States became members of
ESCB,9 2 they are not members of ECB. In accordance with the
provisions of Article 123 of the E.C. Treaty, new Member States
will not be involved in the appointment of the members of the
Executive Board of ECB until they adopt the Euro. The Gover-
nors of the NCBs of the new Member States became members of
the General Council of ECB, 93 but not the more important Gov-
erning Council. The General Council's membership comprises
the President and Vice President of ECB plus the governors of
- The achievement of a high degree of price stability; this will be apparent from a rate
of inflation which is close to that of, at most, the three best performing Mem-
ber States in terms of price stability;
- The sustainability of the government financial position; this will be apparent from
having achieved a government budgetary position without an excessive defi-
cit as determined in accordance with Article 104(6);
- The observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-
rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least two years,
without losing value compared to the currency of any other Member State;
and
- The durability of convergence achieved by the Member State and of its participa-
tion in the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System be-
ing reflected in the long-term interest-rate levels.
See id. (emphasis added).
The criteria are further detailed in a Protocol attached to the Treaty. See E.C. Treaty,
supra note 4, Protocol on the convergence criteria referred to in Article 109j of the
Treaty establishing the European Community, O.J. C 224/1, at 121 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 770-71 [hereinafter Protocol on Convergence Criteria].
90. The main exception being, that the sanctions in case of excessive deficits (Arti-
cle 104 of the E.C. Treaty), can not be applied to these States and that Article 119 and
120 (escape clause) continue to apply. See SMITs, supra note 6, at 135.
91. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 116, O.J. C 325/33.
92. See id. art. 107; see also Statute of the ESCB and the ECB, supra note 81, art. 1.
93. Article 123(3) E.C. Treaty contains the reference to General Council of ECB.
See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 123(3), O.J. C 325/33. More detailed provisions on it
are in Article 45 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB. See Statute of the ESCB and
the ECB, supra note 81. The responsibilities of the General Council are defined in
Article 47. See id. art. 47.
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the NCBs of all EU Member States. The General Council coordi-
nates monetary policies of all EU Member States; it has oversight
of the advisory and reporting activities of ECB, the collection of
statistical information, the conditions of employment of the staff
of ECB, and also holds general discussions about progress within
the Euro-area.94
In accordance with the conclusion of the Luxembourg Eu-
ropean Council in December 1997, the Ministers of the Member
States participating in the Euro-area may meet informally among
themselves to discuss issues connected with their shared specific
responsibilities for the single currency. Matters of common in-
terest will be discussed by Ministers of these Member States in
the so-called "Eurogroup" meetings. Nevertheless, any binding
decisions must be taken by the ECOFIN Council (finance minis-
ters of all Member States) in accordance with the procedures
laid down in the E.C. Treaty.95 This approach might change in
the future. The controversial Article III (88-90) on an ECOFIN
Council for the Euro-zone in the Draft Constitution for Europe
provides that economic coordination measures relating to the
States participating in the Euro-zone may only be adopted by
Council members representing Euro-zone States.96 However,
this proposal has been severely criticized by Member States
outside the Euro-zone.
The new Member States must show their adherence to the
aims of EMU. Compliance with the relevant parts of Title VII of
the E.C. Treaty and the other EMU acquis imply:
- treatment of economic policies as a matter of common con-
cern and coordination of economic policies between the
Member States through participation in Community proce-
dures;97
- avoidance of excessive government deficits and adherence
to the relevant provisions of SGP;98
- compliance of the national central bank's statutes with the
94. See id.
95. Resolution of the European Council of 13 December 1997 on economic policy
coordination in Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union and Treaty Articles 109
and 109(b), Luxembourg, Dec. 13, 1997, E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 17 (1997) [hereinafter
Luxembourg Resolution].
96. See Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, art. III (88-90), O.J. C
169 (2003).
97. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 98 & 99, O.J. C 325/33.
98. See id. art. 104.
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E.C. Treaty and the Statute of ESCB;99
- progress towards the achievement of a high degree of sus-
tainable convergence;'
- treatment of exchange rate policies as a matter of common
interest and, possibly, participation in the exchange rate
mechanism.''
The Member States must conduct their economic policies
with a view to achieving the Article 2 objectives and in the con-
text of Article 98 of the E.C. Treaty.'012 Under Article 99 of the
E.C. Treaty, Member States agree to "regard their economic pol-
icies as a matter of common concern" and coordinate them in
accordance with the broad guidelines on economic policy estab-
lished by the ECOFIN Council'0 3 acting by qualified majority on
the basis of conclusions reached by the European Council.10 4
This procedure begins each Spring, when all Member States sub-
mit their drafts of the subsequent year's budgets and economic
forecasts to the Commission for review.'0 5 On the basis of the
Commission's analysis and recommendations, the ECOFIN
Council adopts draft economic policy guidelines for the Com-
munity and each Member State and submits them to the Euro-
pean Council for conclusions. E.C. Treaty Article 99(3) and (4)
then set up a multilateral surveillance procedure 0 6 within the
Council in order to monitor the consistency of economic poli-
cies of the Member States with the aforementioned guide-
99. See id. art. 109.
100. See id. art. 121.
101. See id. art. 124.
102. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 2 & 98, O.J. C 325/33.
103. The Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 in its resolution on
economic policy coordination declared that under the terms of the E.C. Treaty, the
ECOFIN Council is the center for the coordination of the Member States economic
policies and is empowered to act in relevant areas. See Luxembourg Resolution, supra
note 95. In particular, ECOFIN Council is the only body empowered to formulate and
adopt the economic policy guidelines which constitute the main instrument of eco-
nomic coordination. See id.
104. The Treaty requires all Member States, whether or not they are included in
the final stage of Monetary Union, to submit to a process of economic policy coordina-
tion, a process that significantly restricts unilateral national economic decision making.
See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 99, O.J. C 325/33.
105. See Economic Surveillance Regulation, supra note 84, art. 4.
106. Pipkorn comments that this procedure is inspired by Decision 9/141 EEC of
the Council on progressive convergence, O.J. L 78/23 (1990). See Pipkorn, supra note 6,
at 273.
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lines. °7 If the Member State's economic policies are inconsis-
tent with the guidelines or risk jeopardizing the proper function-
ing of EMU, the Council may make any necessary
recommendations public.'0 8 Article 99(5) enables the Council
to adopt detailed rules for surveillance procedures pursuant to
Article 252 of the E.C. Treaty. Under Article 100 of the E.C.
Treaty, the Council may decide upon the measures appropriate
to the economic situation, particularly when severe difficulties
arise in the supply of certain products.0 9
In order to ensure the proper functioning of EMU and facil-
itate maintenance of price stability, provisions of the E.C. Treaty
also limit certain financial activities of EU and Member States.
Thus, Article 101 prohibits any direct public sector financing by
the central banks, and Article 102 prohibits privileged access of
the public sector to financial institutions. Finally, Article 103
provides that neither EU nor any Member State will be liable for,
or assume commitments of, the Governments of the (other)
Member States, or of public bodies at a lower level than that of
the central Government. t t°
Not only must the new Member States immediately join in
the economic coordination governed by E.C. Treaty Article 99,
but they must strive to avoid excessive governmental deficits pur-
suant to E.C. Treaty Article 104.11 Avoiding excessive deficits is
one of the principal convergence criteria that must be satisfied
before a State can join the third stage of EMU.' 1 2 Pursuant to
Article 104 of the E.C. Treaty, the Commission has the duty to
monitor Member States' compliance with the Council's guide-
lines on budgetary discipline and makes judgments on the exis-
tence or otherwise of excessive deficits. The Commission uses
107. See SMiTS, supra note 6, at 69-74; see also BERMANN ET AL., supra note 10, at
1214-15 (2002).
108. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 99(4), O.J. C 325/33.
109. See id. art. 100.
110. See id.
111. Excessive Deficit Procedure ("EDP") is set out in Article 104 of the E.C.
Treaty and the Protocol on the EDP, which is annexed to the E.C. Treaty. See E.C.
Treaty, supra note 4, art. 104, O.J. C 325/33; see also id., Protocol 20 on the Excessive
Deficit Procedure [hereinafter EDP Protocol], which supplements Article 104.
112. Member States in the second stage of EMU shall in accordance with Article
116, E.C. Treaty, endeavor to avoid excessive government deficit only. See E.C. Treaty,
supra note 4, art. 116, O.J. C 325/33.
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two criteria for this task:' 13
- Whether the ratio of the planned or actual government def-
icit to gross domestic product ("GDP") exceeds three per-
cent. Deficits above this limit will be considered excessive
except when temporary and due to exceptional circum-
stances; and
- Whether the ratio of government debt to GDP exceeds sixty
percent, unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and ap-
proaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.
The Member States which satisfied the convergence criteria
and entered the final stage of EMU, thus joining the centralized
monetary policy of ECB and accepting the Euro as their cur-
rency, obviously should continue relatively strict budgetary poli-
cies and continue to avoid excessive deficits. For this reason, the
European Council at Amsterdam in June 1997, endorsed the fa-
mous Stability and Growth Pact ("SGP")," 4 intended to ensure
ongoing governmental budgetary discipline.' 15
The SGP commenced on January 1, 1999, when eleven
Member States achieved stage three of EMU. The SGP essen-
tially consists of two Council Regulations.1 16 The first regulation
supplements the economic coordination procedures set out in
E.C. Treaty Article 99.117 This is Council Regulation 1466/97,118
commonly called the "Multilateral Surveillance Regulation."
The Regulation prescribes a system for the review by the Com-
mission and the Council of each State's annual and multi-annual
113. These criteria are derived from the EDP Protocol. See EDP Protocol, supra
note 111.
114. See Resolution of the European Council, O.J. C 236 (1997) (on the Stability
and Growth Pact).
115. See, e.g., BERMANN ET AL., supra note 107, at 1218 (stating "SGP was intended
to insure that Member States would continue strict monetary policies and budgetary
discipline after they entered to final stage of EMU").
116. A 1997 Amsterdam European Council Resolution provides guidance to the
Member States, the Commission and the Council on the application and implementa-
tion of SGP. The States committed themselves to the medium-term target of achieving
budgets that are "close to balance or in surplus." The idea is that attaining such a
position would give the Member States a safety margin which would allow them to deal
with cyclical fluctuations, while always keeping the government deficit below the refer-
ence value of three percent of GDP. See Resolution of the European Council on the
Stability and Growth Pact, O.J. C 236 (1997).
117. See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
118. See Council Regulation No. 1466/97, O.J. L 209/1 (1997) (on the strengthen-
ing of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of
economic policies) [hereinafter "Multilateral Surveillance Regulation"].
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budgetary and economic forecasts, whether the State is within
the Euro-zone, or still outside of it." 9 One of the Regulation's
goals is to prevent the emergence of an excessive deficit at an
early stage. To this end, it establishes two key preventative mea-
sures:
- regular surveillance of Member States' respect of budgetary
commitments; 12 ° and
- early warnings in the event of non-respect of budgetary
targets.
12 1
The main tools of multilateral surveillance are the Member
States' annual stability'2 2 or convergence programs.1 2 3 The Reg-
ulation defines the contents of these programs and sets out rules
for their submission, examination and monitoring. In these pro-
grams, Member States set out their short- and medium-term
budgetary strategies to reach and sustain budget positions that
are "close to balance or in surplus.' 24 Along with the adjust-
ment path towards meeting the medium-term budgetary objec-
tive of the SGP, Member States also submit the expected path of
the general governmental debt ratio.' 2 5 The Member States sub-
mit their programs to the Commission at the end of each calen-
dar year.' 2 6 The Commission then assesses them and, on the ba-
sis of the Commission's recommendation, the Council delivers
an opinion. 127 In the event of a significant divergence of the
budgetary position of a Member States from the medium-term
budgetary objective, or the adjustment path towards it, the sec-
ond preventive measure can be activated. This procedure is re-
ferred to as the early-warning mechanism. 28 It involves the
119. Member States in the Euro-zone submit stability programs; Member States
outside the Euro-zone submit convergence programs. In contrast to stability programs,
the convergence programs also deal with monetary policy and aim at achieving sus-
tained convergence.
120. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 5 & 9, OJ. C 325/33.
121. See id. arts. 6 & 10.
122. See id. art. 3.
123. See id. art. 7.
124. Id. arts. 3(2)(a) & 7(2)(a).
125. Member States in Euro-zone submit stability programs; Member States
outside the Euro-zone submit convergence programs. In contrast to stability programs,
the convergence programs aim to achieve sustained convergence in order to ultimately
join the Euro-zone.
126. See Economic Surveillance Regulation, supra note 84, arts. 4 & 8.
127. See id. arts. 5 & 9.
128. See id. arts. 6 & 10.
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Council, on the basis of a Commission recommendation, ad-
dressing an early warning to the Member State, urging and rec-
ommending corrective actions.1 29
Council Regulation No. 1467/973 provides a detailed clari-
fication of the sanction mechanisms, building on the Excessive
Deficit Procedure Protocol, as set out in Article 104 of the E.C.
Treaty. Once the deficit of a Member State goes above three
percent of Gross Domestic Product ("GDP"), the Council must
conclude that the country has an excessive deficit, unless the
breach is due to exceptional circumstances, is temporary and the
deficit remains close to the reference value. The Regulation de-
fines what is meant by "exceptional and temporary" for this pur-
pose, thus essentially indicating when the three percent limit
may be exceeded.131
The Commission has to apply rather strict standards in or-
der to qualify a deficit over the reference value as exceptional.
As a rule, a deficit is automatically considered exceptional by the
Commission only if the Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") of the
State involved fell by at least two percent fell by at least two per-
cent of GDP in the year in question. In addition, the Council
may consider a deficit exceptional even if the State's annual
GDP fell by less than two percent, in the light of the abruptness
of the downturn or the accumulated loss of output relative to
past trends.
The Council has, accordingly, some discretionary room in
deciding whether a deficit owing to a severe economic downturn
is exceptional and hence not excessive. Where an excessive defi-
cit is judged by the Council to exist, the Member State con-
129. The Commission explains the early-warning mechanism as follows: "The pur-
pose of the early warning is to send a signal to the Member State concerned that the
budgetary targets, which had been endorsed by the Council, have not been adhered to.
It also gives the Member States sufficient time to take corrective measures if appropriate
so as to avoid budget deficits approaching the [three percent] of GDP reference value.
As such, it is an important signaling device on the need for enhanced vigilance. The
SPG foresees a clear sequencing of events, with an early warning being issued prior to
recourse being made to the dissuasive elements of the SGP, namely the excessive deficit
procedure." COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PUBLIC FINANCES IN EMU-
2002, EUROPEAN ECONOMY 45-46 (2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/econ-
omy-finance/publications/European-economy/public-finances2002_en.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 12, 2004).
130. Council Regulation No. 1467/97, O.J. L 209/6 (1997) (on speeding up and
clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure).
131. See id. arts. 2(2) & (3).
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cerned must take measures that aim to bringing deficits below
the three percent of GDP reference value. A repeated failure to
take corrective measures could eventually lead to the imposition
of sanctions, which ultimately take the form of fines up to one-
half of one percent of GDP." 2 The Regulation specifies the
rules on sanctions, together with guidance on their application,
and sets deadlines for implementing the different steps in the
procedure. It sets a deadline for decisions on sanctions and re-
quires a non-interest-bearing deposit from the Member States
concerned, which is to be converted into a fine if, two years later,
the excessive deficit persists.1 33 When there is progress in cor-
recting the excessive deficit, sanctions can be abrogated.' 34 The
request for a deposit, however, will be lifted only once the Coun-
cil concludes that the excessive deficit has been corrected and
fines are never reimbursed. 135
According to the Commission, the new Member States will
be quickly and fully integrated into the existing EU procedures
of budgetary surveillance and economic policy coordination, ap-
plying the same rules to the new Member States as to existing
Member States. For example, they were immediately included in
the 2004 update of the national economic policy guidelines.
36
The Council is to start providing country-specific recommenda-
tions and the new Member States will for the first time be in-
cluded in the Implementation Report on the economic policy
guidelines in January 2005.
With respect to budgetary surveillance, the new States are
supposed to comply with the reporting deadlines (before March
1 and before September 1) on fiscal notifications in 2004.37 In-
deed, if necessary, the Commission could start an EDP process
concerning a new State.1 38 However, since the new Member
132. See id. arts. 6-7, 11-12.
133. See id. art. 13.
134. See id. art. 14.
135. See id. art. 15.
136. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPREHENSIVE MONITORING REPORT ON THE
STATE OF PREPAREDNESS FOR EU MEMBERSHIP OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, ESTONIA, CYPRUS,
LATVIA, LITHUANIA, HUNGARY, MALTA, POLAND, SLOVENIA AND SLOVAKIA 21 (2003), avail-
able at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_- 2003/pdf/summary.paper
2003.full-en.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COM-
PREHENSIVE MONITORING REPORT].
137. See id.
138. See id.
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States have the status of the Member States with derogation,139
the provisions of EDP do not apply fully. If, as part of the moni-
toring and surveillance process outlined in Council Regulation
1466/97, the Council, on the basis of a Commission recommen-
dation, would conclude that a new Member State's budgetary po-
sition significantly diverged from its medium-term budgetary tar-
get, the Council could address an "early warning" recommenda-
tion to the new Member State to take the necessary adjustment
measures to prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit. t4 °
If the divergence persisted or worsened, the Council would
make a recommendation to take prompt corrective measures.1
4 1
In the event of the Council finding that the candidate country
had an excessive deficit under Regulation 1467/97, the Council
would make a recommendation to the candidate country with a
view to bringing the situation to an end within a given period.
As a Member State with a derogation, however, the new Member
State could not be sanctioned for running an excessive deficit or
for any other budgetary position that did not comply with the
rules of SGP.
The new Member States submitted their first Convergence
Programs by May 15, 2004, essentially an update of their Pre-
Accession Economic Plans ("PAEPs"). 4 2 The new Convergence
Programs should be submitted, in line with the Council's Code
of Conduct, 43 between mid-October and December 1, 2004.114
139. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 121, OJ. C 325/33.
140. See Economic Surveillance Regulation, supra note 84, art. 10(2).
141. See id. art. 10(3).
142. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPREHENSIVE MONITORING REPORT, supra note
136, at 21.
143. "Code of Conduct on the Content and Format of Stability and Convergence
Programs," endorsed by the ECOFIN Council on July 10, 2001, incorporates the essen-
tial elements of Council Regulation 1466/97 into guidelines to assist the Member States
in drawing up their programs. See Press Release, ECOFIN Council, Results of the Coun-
cil of Economics and Finance Ministers, 10 July 2001 - Taxation and Financial Services,
MEMO/O1/261 (2001). The guidelines set out in the Code constitute a code of good
practice and a checklist to be used by Member States in preparing stability or conver-
gence programs. See id. The Code encompasses a set of standardized tables. See id. It
also suggests that the annual updates are all submitted in the autumn, within a period
of one and a half months. See id. The aim of the guidelines is to facilitate the evaluation
of the programs by the Commission and Council. See id.
144. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPREHENSIVE MONITORING REPORT, supra note
136, at 22.
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C. ESCB - The Revision in Structure of the
Governing Council of ECB14 5
As described above, the highest decision-making body of the
Euro-system is the Governing Council of ECB, which consists of
the six members of ECB's Executive Board and the governors of
those NCBs, whose countries have adopted Euro. In order to
facilitate efficiency of the Governing Council, the European
Council adopted a decision amending the Statute of ESCB/ECB
with regard to voting rights.
146
The procedure for its adoption was as follows. 4 7 On De-
cember 20, 2002, ECB announced that it was going to put for-
ward a recommendation for reform of the voting procedures in
the Governing Council. The Governing Council formally
adopted a proposal on February 3, 2003, just two days after the
Nice Treaty came into force. 4 On February 19, 2003 the Com-
mission issued its Opinion on the ECB proposal.149 On March
10, 2003, the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the
European Parliament rejected the ECB's proposal. 50 On March
21, 2003, the European Council endorsed the ECB proposal and
agreed to its proposed reform of the voting modalities of the
Governing Council.'
145. See HOUSE OF LoRDs, SELECT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN UNION, FORY-SECOND
REPORT, 2003, at 37-45, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
ld200203/ldselect/ldeucom/170/17001.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter
HOUSE OF LORDS, FORTY-SECOND REPORT].
146. See Decision of the Council, 2003/223/EC, O.J. L 83/66 (2003) [hereinafter
ESCB/ECB] (meeting in the composition of Heads of States or Governments on March
21, 2003; on amendment to Article 10.2 of the Statute of the European System of Cen-
tral Banks and European Central Bank). It is regrettable that the enabling clause pro-
vided by the Treaty of Nice was drawn so tightly as to prevent the Commission and the
ECB from considering more radical proposals for reform of the Governing Council and
instead limited them to considerations of its voting procedures.
147. See HOUSE OF LORDS, FORTY-SECOND REPORT, supra note 145.
148. The Treaty of Nice was signed on March 10, 2001 and came into force on
February 1, 2003. See Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Mar. 10,
2001, O.J. C 80/1 (2001).
149. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPREHENSIVE MONITORING REPORT, supra note
136, at 84.
150. See Documents for the meeting of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Com-
mittee of the European Parliament on March 10, 2003, available at http://www.
europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/committees/econ/20030310/ECON20030310.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 1, 2004).
151. See ESCB/ECB, 2003/223/EC, O.J. L 83/66 (2003).
2004] CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND MEDITERRANEAN STATES 171
The new voting system is based on rotation of the voting
rights of the NCB governors, with only the six members of the
Executive Board retaining a permanent vote.152 The frequency
of the rotation will not be the same for all governors, with differ-
ent groups being created based on the GDP of the country con-
cerned, slightly modified by a formula based on the size of the
financial industry sector. 153
The revision will happen in two stages. When there are
more than fifteen, but fewer than twenty-two Member States, the
Member States of the Euro-area will be divided into two
groups. 15" In this first stage of reform, the five largest Member
States (measured by the ranking indicator) will form the first
group, having four votes. The remaining smaller countries will
share the other eleven votes. In the second stage1 5 of reform
(to be implemented from the point when the Euro-area expands
to twenty-two or more Members), the Member States will be di-
vided into three groups. The first group will remain confined to
the five largest Member States, who will still share four votes.
The second group will comprise the next largest countries; half
the total number of Euro-area Member States, rounding up if
necessary; these countries will share eight votes. The third group
will contain the remaining six to nine countries, and will have
three votes.
The described reform is very controversial and was subject
of severe criticism.1 56 The principal criticisms can be summa-
rized as follows: 157 (1) the Governing Council would still be too
large, making it inefficient; (2) the proposal was unclear on a
number of points; (3) the proposal is far too complex and is
therefore not transparent; (4) the proposal emphasizes national-
ity as the basis for who can vote; and (5) the speed by which the
proposal was adopted by the Council did not allow the requisite
time for parliamentary scrutiny.
152. See id.
153. See id. 1.
154. See id. 2.
155. See id. 2.
156. See, e.g., Daniel Gros, Reforming the Composition of the ECB Governing Council in
view of Enlargement: An Opportunity Missed!, 32 C.E.P.S. PoL'Y BRIEFS, May 2003, available
at http://shop.ceps.be/BookDetail.php?item-id=1028 (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
157. See HOUSE OF LORDS, FORTY-SECOND REPORT, supra note 145, at 40-42 (provid-
ing detailed analysis of critics of reform of the voting procedures in the Governing
Council of the ECB).
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Criticisms of reform of the voting procedures in the Gov-
erning Council are all substantial and well-founded. The most
troubling point of the reform, which touches on one of the core
principles of Euro-system, 58 is the threat to independence of the
ECB's decision-making processes from national considerations.
From the Article of the new Member States, the most disturbing
issue is the use of the relative size of the financial sector as a
ranking indicator, since their financial sectors are considerably
smaller than the ones of the current Euro-zone States.
III. CONVERGENCE CRITERIA
To ensure the sustainable convergence for the single mone-
tary and exchange rate policy, the E.C. Treaty sets four conver-
gence criteria"' which must be met by each Member State
before adoption of the Euro. The convergence criteria consist
of: (1) the achievement of a high degree of price stability; (2)
the durability of convergence being reflected in the long-term
interest-rate levels; (3) the sustainability of the government fi-
nancial position; and 4) the observance of the normal fluctua-
tion margins.
The Commission and the ECB shall prepare reports for the
Council which will examine the compatibility of each Member
State's national legislation with the provisions of the E.C. Treaty.
Reports will also examine the fulfillment of mentioned eco-
nomic convergence criteria as well as several other factors, such
as "the results of the integration of markets, the situation and
development of the balances of payments on current account
and an examination of the development of unit labor costs and
other price indices.' 160
158. The NCB Governors sit on the Governing Council "in a personal and inde-
pendent capacity," not as national representatives. See Explanatory Memorandum of the
ECB's Recommendation to amend the voting modalities of the Governing Council, OJ.
C 29 (2003).
159. Smits identifies five conditions; besides the four economic converge criteria,
he also focuses on the "legal convergence criteria" as set out in Article 121 (1) in con-
nection with compatibility of national legislation with EMU provision of the E.C. Treaty,
especially regarding the independence of the national central banks and their ability to
operate in the ESCB framework. See SMITS, supra note 6, at 121-23.
160. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, POLICY POSITION OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK ON THE EXCHANGE RATE ISSUES RELATING TO THE ACCED-
ING COUNTRIES 6, Dec. 18, 2003, available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/policyac-
cexchangerateen.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK,
POLICY POSITION].
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From the perspective of the new Member States, the most
important issues in connection with convergence are whether,
when adopting the Euro, they will be subject to the existing con-
vergence criteria, and how the convergence criteria will be ap-
plied. Regarding the first question, there seems to not be much
space for maneuvering. Although the Protocols1 61 that specify in
detail the convergence criteria generally set down by Article 121
may be modified by the Council acting unanimously, it is un-
likely that the existing convergence criteria would be substan-
tially relaxed for the new Member States. According to former
President of the Executive Board of ECB Willem Duisenberg,
"the Euro-system should support equal treatment as a key fea-
ture of the accession process. This implies that objective and
uniform criteria should apply, in turn, to accession, participation
in ERM II and adoption of the Euro. 1 6 2
Regarding the issue of the application of convergence crite-
ria to new Member States, it must be stressed that although the
four economic convergence criteria seem to be very precise, they
contain a number of ambiguities. 63 Since the entrance of the
Community into the third stage of EMU, the relevant provisions
become even more unclear due to the fact that they were prima-
rily drafted to that end. In the following paragraphs, this Article
shall try to indicate the most important issues in this regard.
A. The Achievement of a High Degree of Price Stability
The first criterion 164 requires that a Member State has a
price performance that is sustainable; an average rate of infla-
tion, observed over a period of one year before the examination,
that does not exceed by more than one and one-half percentage
points that of, at most, the three best performing Member States
in terms of price stability.1 65
The most ambiguous part of this provision is the definition
161. See Protocol on Convergence Criteria, supra note 89; see also Protocol No. 18
on EDP.
162. See Duisenberg, supra note 64, at 14.
163. See Kenen, supra note 59, at 360.
164. As set out in Article 121(1) and further detailed in Article 1 of the Protocol
on Convergence Criteria. See Protocol on Convergence Criteria, supra note 89, art. 1 &
art. 121(1).
165. Regulation 2494/95 is very important for ensuring the accuracy of the infla-
tion statistics necessary for assessing satisfaction of the inflation convergence criterion
on harmonization indices of consumer prices See O.J L 257/1 (1995).
174 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:145
of the "three best performing Member States in terms of price
stability. 1 66 Since this provision was written before the transi-
tion of the Community to the third stage of EMU, it is not clear
who is in the pool of the "three best performing Member
States,' 1 67 i.e., is it all Member States, Member States in Euro-
zone, Member States outside Euro-zone, or Member States
outside Euro-zone without Denmark and the United King-
dom? 16 ' Neither the E.C. Treaty nor the Protocol on Conver-
gence Criteria makes any reference in this regard. For the new
Member States, it would be easiest to achieve the inflation rate
criterion if the Member States outside Euro-zone without Den-
mark and the United Kingdom is the reference group. Never-
theless, it is not very plausible that the ECOFIN Council 6 as the
authorized body would adopt such interpretation.7 0
B. The Durability of Convergence Reflected in the
Long Term Interest Rate Level
The second criterion1 7 ' requires that, observed over a pe-
riod of one year before the examination, a Member State has
had an average nominal long-term interest rate that does not
exceed by more than two percentage points that of, at most, the
three best performing Member States in terms of price stability.
Interest rates shall be measured on the basis of long-term gov-
ernment bonds or comparable securities, taking into account
differences in national definitions. Since this criterion is closely
166. Smits also refers to other ambiguities in the language of this provision. See
SMITS, supra note 13, at 124.
167. The pool in which the "three best Member States" are identified is very im-
portant for the new Member States, because it sets the scope for determining the infla-
tion criterion.
168. Since the United Kingdom and Denmark Protocols grant them the ability to
opt out, one could argue that they have a special status and therefore do not form part
of a reference group.
169. The ECOFIN Council is the Council in its comoiosition as the Ministers for
Finance. See, e.g., BERMANN ET AL., supra note 107, at 35.
170. It is not surprising, therefore, that the new Member States and various re-
search institutions are using all Member States as a reference group. See, e.g., SLOVENIAN
GOVERNMENT AND SLOVENIAN CENTRAL BANK, PROGRAM FOR ERM II ENTRY AND ADOPTION
OF EURO 24, Nov. 2003, available at http://www.bsi.si/html/eng/publications/Europe/
ERM2_BS_Vlada_200311.pdf; 1 DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH, E.U. MONITOR, Apr. 2003,
available at http://www.dbresearch.de/PROD/DBRINTERNETEN-PROD/PROD
0000000000053172.PDF (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
171. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 121(1); see also Protocol on Convergence
Criteria, supra note 89, art. 1.
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related to the inflation rate criterion, the above discussion on
reference group for "three best performing Member States" also
entirely applies here.
C. The Sustainability of the Government Financial Position
(Budget Deficit and Public Debt)
The criterion on sustainability of the government financial
position 172 is comprised of two additional criteria. The criterion
on the government budgetary position requires that a Member
State have a ratio of planned or actual government deficit to
GDP that does not exceed 3%, unless:
- either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously
and reached a level that comes close to the reference value;
or
- the excess of the reference value is only exceptional and
temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference
value.
The criterion on government debt requires that a Member
State has a ratio of government debt to GDP that does not ex-
ceed 60%, unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and ap-
proaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.
These two criteria were by far the most difficult 173 at the
time of the transition to the third stage of EMU and the creation
of the single currency (the Euro) in 1999. Due to their impor-
tance, it is understandable that the drafters of the relevant E.C.
Treaty provisions gave them a certain degree of flexibility and
discretion to the relevant decision making bodies. These discre-
tionary powers and their usage by the Commission and the
Council in 1998 were the subject of severe criticism by some
commentators. 174 Although the criterion on the government
budgetary position remains the most difficult criterion to
achieve for several new Member States (according to the availa-
ble data175 the new Member States should not have problems
172. As set out in Article 121 (1) and 104 further detailed in Article 2 of the Proto-
col on Convergence Criteria and Protocol on EDP. See Protocol on Convergence Crite-
ria, supra note 89, art. 2.
173. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 107, at 1217.
174. See, e.g., Beaumont & Walker, supra note 59, at 174-75.
175. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN ECONOMY, ENLARGEMENT PAPERS No. 14,
EVALUATION OF THE 2002 PRE-ACCESSION ECONOMIC PROGRAMS OF NEW MEMBER STATES 16,
Nov. 2002, available at http://Europa.eu.int/comm/economy-finance/publications/
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with achieving the criterion on government debt), it seems that
their application for the new Member States will be much less
controversial as for existing members of the Euro-zone. There
are several reasons for this situtation:
- the political implications of the decision that Member
States will join the final stage of EMU and adopt the Euro
were much stronger and crucial in 1998 when the creation
of a single currency was at stake than it Will be when the
new Member States try to adopt the Euro;
- when EMU is fully functioning, the need for new members
will no longer be its first priority. Far more important is the
stability and proper functioning of EMU. For monetary
union to be workable, the government deficits should be
kept at an acceptable level;
- all new Member States except Cyprus and Malta are transi-
tional economies and therefore potentially more unstable
than the economies of the current members of the Euro-
zone;
- apart from the mentioned discretionary powers of the Com-
mission and the Council, the subject criteria is fairly clear,
i.e., government deficit should not exceed three percent of
GDP and government debt to GDP should not exceed sixty
percent; and
- the senior officials of ECB repeatedly stress the importance
of the sustainable real convergence and rigorous applica-
tion of the nominal convergence criteria. Thus, it is highly
unlikely that the discretionary powers would be exercised in
the case of the new Member States.
D. The Exchange Rate Criterion and ERM II
The final criterion t7 6 requires the observance of the normal
fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange rate mecha-
nism of the EMS for at least the last two years before the exami-
nation. In particular, the Member State shall not have devalued
its currency's bilateral central rate against any other Member
State's currency on its own initiative for the same period.
It appears that this criterion is the most unclear, but also the
enlargement.papers/elpl4_en.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, ENLARGEMENT PAPERS No. 14].
176. As set out in Article 121(1) and further detailed in Article 3 of the Protocol
on Convergence Criteria. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 121 (1); see also Protocol on
Convergence Criteria, supra note 89, art. 3.
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most important from the Article of the new Member States. Ex-
amining the wording of the E.C. Treaty and the Protocol, one
can distinguish four fairly precise requirements related to the
criterion: (1) the observance of normal fluctuation margins; (2)
no severe tension; (3) the observance of time-frame (at least two
years); and (4) no devaluation.
At the time the Maastricht Treaty (with provisions on EMU)
was drafted, "normal fluctuation margins" 7 7 were ±2.25%.178 At
the time of the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty, no one could
predict the dramatic events of 1992 and 1993 when speculation
was rampant. In the efforts to defend the bands, some of the
central banks lost large portions of their foreign reserves. In Au-
gust 1993, in order to put an end to speculation the band was
widened. 79 The new band allowed for 15% fluctuation above
and below the parity. This situation caused problems with inter-
pretation of the term "normal fluctuation margin." The major
contradiction concerning the exchange rate criterion appeared
between "the spirit" and the letter of the E.C. Treaty.'
On January 1, 1999 the EMS ceased to exist and ERM was
replaced by the ERM 11.18 The standard fluctuation margin in
177. See Resolution of the European Council, 6 E.C. BULL. (1978) (on establish-
ment of the European Monetary System and related matters); see also BERMANN ET AL.,
supra note 107, at 1209-11.
178. As an exception to the rule, ± 6% fluctuation was allowed for some curren-
cies: the Italian lira till 1990; the British pound; the Spanish peseta; and the Portuguese
escudo.
179. See SMITS supra note 6, at 21.
180. According to Marcin Zogala, the spirit of the criterion was to prove that stable
exchange rate could be maintained. The letter of the criterion, however, allowed the
exchange rate to fluctuate within a 30%-wide band, which is difficult to identify with
exchange rate stability. Moreover, the widening of the band in 1993 was meant to be a
temporary measure with the expectation of returning to the narrow margins, which
eventually was not the case. As a solution to this dilemma the Commission proposed
the system be based on the so-called "median currency." The median currency was
selected as the mid-point currency in this ranking. In the median currency approach,
ERM currencies were allowed to fluctuate 15% above and below its central parity
against other EU Member States, but the stability of exchange rates was assessed in the
context of fluctuation margin of plus or minus two and one-quarter percent around the
median currency. The Commission used the narrow band as an indicator. The breach
of the plus or minus two and one-quarter percent margin was recognized as a possible
"severe tension." See Marcin Zogala, The Maastricht Exchange Rate Criterion: What Do We
Know, What Do We Need to Know , in EASTwARD ENLARGEMENT OF THE EURO-ZONE - IMPACT
ON TRADE, FDI AND CAPITAL MARKETS 43-44 (K. Zukrowska & D. Sobczak eds., 2003).
181. See Resolution of the European Council, supra note 114, O.J. C 236.
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ERM II has been set at plus or minus fifteen percent. 8 2 Hence,
in the new system there is no interpretation problem with the
"normal" margin. Nonetheless, in the Convergence Reports of
2000 and 2002, the Commission still applied the narrow band as
an indicator of severe tensions.1 8 1 It appears therefore that
Commission's interpretation of the fulfillment of this criterion
requires the exchange rate to have been maintained within the
fluctuating margin of plus or minus two and one-quarter percent
around the central party (Euro) in ERM II.ls4 In other words, to
fulfill the exchange-rate convergence criterion, the currency
must be part of ERM II yet stay within a range that is narrower
than the standard ±15% fluctuation band. So, the maintenance
of exchange-rate stability is closely linked to the ERM II, but the
two terms are not interchangeable, as it is possible for a country
to participate in ERM II and not yet fulfill (or even be heading
towards fulfilling) the exchange-rate convergence criterion. The
Commission's proposed application' 1 5 of the exchange-rate con-
182. See id.
183. The Commission expressed its standpoint on the fulfillment of the exchange-
rate criterion in ERM II in its 2000 Convergence Report, Annex D, Article (D) (4) as
follows:
- participation in the ERM II at the time of the assessment is mandatory;
- participation in the ERM/ERM II for at least two years is expected, although
exchange rate stability during a period of non-participation before entering
ERM/ERM II can be taken into account;
- no downward realignment of the central parity either in the ERM or in the
ERM II within the two-year examination period; and
- exchange rate to have been maintained within a fluctuation band of plus or
minus two and one-quarter percent around the currency's central parity
against the Euro. An assessment of any deviation from the plus or minus two
and one-quarter percent fluctuation band would have to take account the
reasons for that deviation. A distinction is to be made between exchange rate
movements above the two and one-quarter percent upper margin and move-
ments below the two and one-quarter percent lower margin.
See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2000 CONVERGENCE REPORT, Annex D, art. (D) (4) (2000); see
also Zogala, supra note 180, at 45.
184. This is also current understanding of Czech National Bank following consul-
tations with competent EU and ECB authorities. See CZECH CENTRAL BANK, ERM II AND
THE EXCHANGE-RATE CONVERGENCE CRITERION, INFORMATION MATERIAL FOR CZECH GOV-
ERNMENT 3 (2003). Moreover, the issue of absence of "severe tensions" is generally
addressed: 1) by examining the degree of deviation of exchange rates from the ERM II
central rates against the Euro; 2) by using indicators such as short-term interest rate
differentials vis-ft-vis the Euro-area and their evolution; and 3) by considering the role
played by foreign exchange interventions. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, POLICY POSI-
TION, supra note 160, at 6.
185. However, the ECB's position on this issue is much less clear. According to the
Member of the Executive Board of ECB, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, the width of the
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vergence criterion is not based on any official decision of the
ECOFIN Council or the European Council. Theoretically, since
the Council makes the final decision on when an applicant quali-
fies for adoption of the Euro, the Council could disregard the
Commission's view and confirm an applicant even though it
would not fulfill the exchange-rate convergence criterion as in-
terpreted by the Commission. However, such a decision is not
very plausible. Because of the potential sensitivity of the Euro-
system to forthcoming post-transitional economies, the Council
would have to have a very strong "political" reason to clash with
the Commission on such decision. At this time, no political rea-
son is apparent. Statements of the senior officials of relevant EU
bodies indicate that no considerable concessions (as was the case
in 1998) will be granted to the new Member States.
1. Required Duration of the ERM II Membership
Membership in ERM II is voluntary and is not subject to any
criteria. There are no preconditions to be fulfilled to join the
ERM II mechanism. 186 The important question is whether for-
mal participation in the ERM II is required along with actual
exchange rate stability. Neither the E.C. Treaty nor the Protocol
on Convergence Criteria expressly requires formal membership
in the ERM II, but requires respect for the normal fluctuation
fluctuation band within ERM II will not prejudice the assessment of the criterion of
exchange rate stability. See Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Exchange Rate Issues Relating to
the Acceding Countries, Speech, Feb. 2, 2004, at 7. Although there is a great demand
for being very specific in all respects already at this stage, the added precision would not
only run counter to the institutional framework in place, but would also imply undue
rigidity, leading to mechanistic assessments that would benefit no one. The reluctance
to be more precise or to pre-empt the decision-making, which ultimately involves not
only a quantitative but equally so a qualitative assessment, has to be seen in this light. See
id.
186. According to the policy position of the Governing Council of ECB, the deci-
sions regarding the timing of entry and duration of participation in ERM II should be
based on the extent to which participation in the mechanism enhances the prospects of
achieving a lasting convergence of economic fundamentals. To determine their opti-
mal strategy regarding ERM II and later Euro adoption, the new Member States (then
Member States) will have to consider the specific circumstances of their country, in-
cluding their overall monetary integration strategy, monetary and exchange rate policy
framework and fiscal position. When applying for ERM II the new Member States
should, given the risks implied by premature rigidity of the exchange rate, consider the
degree of achieved convergence. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, POLICY POSITION, supra
note 160, at 4.
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margins of that mechanism for a two year period.'8 7 Neverthe-
less, the formal position of EMI and the Commission was to re-
quire that the ERM membership applies.""8 This position be-
came questionable with the decision to allow Finland and Italy to
join the third stage of EMU in 1998. The Italian lira rejoined
the ERM on November 25, 1996, which results in approximately
fifteen months of participation by the end of February 1998.
The Finish markka joined the system on October 14, 1996, and
by the end of February 1998 had been participating in the ERM
for about sixteen months. It is true though that afterjoining the
system, both currencies satisfied the lower two and one-quarter
percent margin. 89
In light of mentioned developments, the Commission in the
Convergence Report 2000 stated ex post facto that during exami-
nation of exchange rate criterion, it took into account the fol-
lowing conditions: (1) participation in the ERM II at the time of
the assessment is mandatory; (2) participation in the ERM II for
at least two years is expected; and (3) exchange rate stability
before entering ERM II can be taken into account. The Com-
mission, however, also clarified that this was the framework used
in current examination. In addition, the Governing Council of
ECB1' 0 recently indicated that new Member States must not have
devalued their currency's central rate against the Euro on its
own initiative within required period. It also indicated that a
minimum stay of two years in the mechanism (prior to the con-
vergence assessment that leads to final adoption of the Euro), is
expected. The principle of equal treatment would require that
187. The Protocol stipulates that the two-year membership in ERM should be cal-
culated up to "examination," not up to Euro-zone entry. See Protocol on Convergence
Criteria, supra note 89.
188. Zogala, supra note 180, at 46.
189. Convergence Reports 1998 were prepared in March so that the two-year pe-
riod under examination covered March 1996 to February 1998. In the Convergence
Reports of the Commission and EMI, however, the period prior to ERM entry was taken
into account as well. At the beginning of the two year examination period, both lira
and markka were under depreciating pressures. In March 1996, the downward devia-
tion of the lira reached the maximum of 7.6% below its future central rate. In the case
of the Finnish markka, its maximum downward deviation below its future central rate
reached 6.5% in April 1996. Nevertheless, the conclusion of the Commission was that
both Italy and Finland fulfilled exchange rate criterion. See id. at 46-47; see also Beau-
mont & Walker, supra note 59, at 177.
190. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, POLICY POSITION, supra note 160, at 4.
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the same rules apply to the new Member States.' 91 Nonetheless,
as already mentioned, the senior officials of the ECB and the
Commission also continue to emphasize the need and impor-
tance of the sustainable real convergence. 192 They warn against
treating ERM II as simply a waiting room without making any
effort to foster the convergence of the real side of the econ-
omy.193 Hence, it is extremely doubtful whether new Member
States will be allowed to adopt the Euro after participation of
fewer than two years in ERM II.194
2. The Formal Procedure to Join ERM II
Participation in ERM II is voluntary for Member States
outside the Euro-area. As explained above, however, the "sub-
stantive" process for ERM II entry and the subsequent irrevoca-
ble fixing of the currencies of the new Member States against the
Euro will, begin before the formal procedures to join the ERM
II. The key procedural feature of ERM II is the multilateral ap-
proach to making decisions on issues linked to its functioning. 95
Such decisions are taken by the ministers of the Euro-area Mem-
ber States, the ECB and the ministers and central bank gover-
nors of the non-Euro-area Member States participating in ERM
II. The ministers and governors of the central banks of the non-
Euro-area Member States not participating in ERM II take part
but do not have the right to vote in the procedure.'9 6 Such deci-
sions are preceded by a procedure involving the Commission
and EFC.' 97 For the new Member States, the first step (which is
not, however, a direct part of the procedure for participation in
ERM II) is accession to the Agreement between the ECB and the
NCBs of the non-Euro-area Member States. 9" It is possible to
191. "The assessment should be based on the principle of equal treatment with the
current Member States. Therefore, no additional criteria for the adoption of the Euro
by the new Member States will be introduced, while at the same time there will be no
relaxation of the criteria laid out in the Treaty, including the criteria concerning the
sustainability of nominal convergence." Id. at 6.
192. The main deficiency of real convergence is its lack of precision, which gives
the additional room for interpretation and is used as a tool to further delay the process
of inclusion of the new Member States in Euro-area.
193. See Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 185, at 5.
194. Cf EUROPEAN CErrrRAL BANK, POLICY POSITION, supra note 160.
195. See Resolution of the European Council, supra note 169.
196. Id. 2.3.
197. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105, O.J. C 325/33.
198. See Agreement of September 1, 1998 between the European Central Bank and
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sign the agreement and request entry into ERM II at a later date.
The procedure itself consists of several steps.' 99 First, the
Exchange-Rate Procedure may be initiated by a confidential
joint request from a minister and a NCB governor from a coun-
try requesting entry into ERM II (as well as from the decision-
making bodies), addressed to the ECOFIN minister of the coun-
try holding the EU Presidency. At the same time, the EFC mem-
ber(s) from the initiating country inform the President and the
Secretary of the EFC. The Exchange-Rate Procedure takes place
at a confidential meeting of the ERM II Committee. When con-
sensus can be reached on the central rate and fluctuation band,
confirmation of agreement from the authorities of the home
countries is allowed.
Next, the ERM II Committee is called by the EFC President.
Its members are the EFC members from national administra-
tions, the EFC members from the non-Euro-area NCBs, two rep-
resentatives of the ECB, two representatives of the Commission,
the President of the alternates, the EFC President and Secretary,
and two members of the EFC Secretariat. The meeting is a kind
of "pre-screening" of the countries applying to introduce the
Euro (the results of the meeting serving as the basis for the "Ex-
change-rate Procedure"). The Committee discusses and deter-
mines whether the macroeconomic framework of the ERM II ap-
plicant country is consistent with ERM II entry, notably in con-
nection with the BEPGs and the SGP. The Committee also
discusses the appropriate central rate and fluctuation band. The
decision-making bodies of the ECB have meetings prior to the
Committee meeting on the central rate and fluctuation band.
Third, the ERM II Exchange-rate Meeting is called by the
ECOFIN minister of the Member State holding the EU Presi-
dency in following composition: the ministers of the Euro-area
Member States; the ministers and the central bank governors of
the national central banks of the Member States outside the Euro-area laying down the
operating procedures for an exchange rate mechanism in Stage Three of Economic
and Monetary Union, O.J. C 345/05, at 6-12 (1998).
199. Since "Procedural steps to allow participation in ERM II," (a document pre-
pared by the European Commission for the High Level Meeting in Athens on May 28,
2003), a document laying down the procedure to join EMR II is not publicly accessible,
the summary of the subject procedure is based entirely on one Nation's publication. See
CZECH CENTRAL BANK, ERM II AND THE EXCHANGE-RATE CONVERGENCE CRITERION, INFOR-
MATION MATERIAL FOR CZECH GOVERNMENT 7-8 (2003), available at http://www.cnb.cz/
en/pdf/ERMII vlada_15_07_03_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
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the non-Euro-area Member States; the President of the ECB; rep-
resentatives of the Commission; and the President and Secretary
of the EFC. The ERM II Exchange-Rate Meeting adopts the final
central rate and fluctuation band.
The final communiqu6, in the, name of EU, includes the
following elements: (1) the party initiating the procedure and
the parties making the decision; (2) the decision; (3) the central
rate; (4) the fluctuation band; (5) the announcement on the ec-
onomic policy of the Member State; and (6) a statement on the
discussion of intervention points between the ECB and the NCB.
The time schedule for the whole process is not fixed but
depends on the degree of agreement reached between the au-
thorities of the Member State and the bodies of EU. While the
procedure for joining ERM II may be initiated at any time by the
Member State concerned and is not linked to specific calendar
dates, the main features, notably the central rate and the width
of the fluctuation band, have to be agreed upon among all par-
ties involved in the mechanism. The entire process can be very
quick and take just a few days (as in the case of Austria) or it can
last for several months (as in the case of Denmark).
E. Economic Situations of the New Member States in
Light of Convergence Criteria
As is evident from the following table,2 ° currently no new
Member State fulfills the economic convergence criteria. In ad-
dition, no new Member State has yet achieved full legal compati-
bility of its legislation with Article 109 of the E.C. Treaty and the
Statute of ESCB/ECB.01
A look at the present performance in respect of the conver-
gence criteria shows that the criteria still present considerable
difficulty for most of the new Member States. This is true partic-
ularly for their budget deficits and partially for inflation. The
200. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION CONVERGENCE RE-
PORT 2004 (2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy finance/publica-
tions/european economy/2004/cr2004_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 02, 2004). As noted
above, this Article was finished on September 1, 2004. The Commission's Convergence
Report 2004 was published on October 20, 2004. See id. In order to ensure the accuracy
of the available data, the data from the Commission's Convergence Report 2004 was
inserted in this table. No other conclusions of the Convergence Report 2004 published
by Commission and ECB are analyzed in this Article.
201. See id.
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Interest
rates 10 Fiscal Exchange
Inflation % year yield deficit % Public debt rates
in August in August of GDP in % of GDP (membership
2004 2004 2003 in 2003 in ERM II)
Reference value 2.4 6.4 -3.0 60.0 2 years
Czech Republic 1.8 4.7 -12.6 37.8 no
Cyprus 2.1 5.2 -6.4 70.9 no
Estonia 2.0 4.6 3.1 5.3 June 28, 2004
Hungary 6.5 8.1 -6.2 59.1 no
Latvia 4.9 5.0 -1.5 14.4 no
Lithuania 0.2 4.7 -1.9 21.4 June 28, 2004
Malta 2.6 4.7 -9.7 71.1 no
Poland 2.5 6.9 -3.9 45.4 no
Slovakia 8.4 5.1 -3.7 42.6 no
Slovenia 4.1 5.2 -2.0 29.4 June 28, 2004
three largest of the new Member States - the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland - are troubled with high budget deficits,
which in the case of the Czech Republic rose considerably fur-
ther in 2003.202 The Czech deficit would have been much
higher still in 2002 without the abundant proceeds from priva-
tizations.2 °3 Among smaller States, Cyprus and Malta also have
problems with their budget deficits. On inflation, no less than
six of the ten new Member States exceeded the reference value
of 2.4%, the highest rates being registered in Slovakia (8.4%)
and Hungary (6.5%). Except for Cyprus and Malta, the general
government debt in most new Member States was well below the
reference level of sixty percent. From larger new Member
States, Hungary is closest to this threshold with 59.1%. The
more troubling fact regarding Hungary, however, is its strong
trend towards the reference level in past years.
IV. FULFILLMENT OF THE CONVERGENCE CRITERIA IN
ACCESSION COUNTRIES - REQUIRED ECONOMIC POLICIES
A. Nominal and Real Convergence
The nominal convergence is the fulfillment of the conver-
202. The budget deficit of the Czech Republic was six and four-tenths percent in
2002 and twelve and nine-tenths percent in 2003. See Deutsche Bank Research, EU
MONITOR, No. 12, April 2004, 17, available at http://www.dbresearch.de/PROD/DBR-
INTERNETEN-PROD/PROD0000000000076914.pdf (last visited Nov. 02, 2004).
203. See DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH, supra note 170.
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gence criteria as described in the preceding section. Real conver-
gence is comprised of the structural adjustments and real in-
come improvement that signals the entrant is catching up with
EU and Euro-area Member States. No mention is made of real
convergence as a criterion for entry into the third stage of EMU
and adoption of the Euro.2 °4 Nor are these criteria quantified in
the way that those for nominal convergence are quantified. Nev-
ertheless, the importance of the real convergence criteria can be
inferred from the statements of several senior ECB officials, e.g.,
Willem Duisenberg (former President of the Executive Board of
ECB), Christian Noyer (former Vice-President of the Executive
Board of ECB), and Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa and Eugenio So-
lans (Members of the Executive Board of ECB) .205 Real conver-
204. The Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) in Article 2 "indirectly
mentions a need for economic and social cohesion, which is intended to eliminate
disparities between countries and regions," but criteria for real convergence are not
specifically laid down. See TEU, supra note 51, art. 2, O.J. C 224/1; see also JOINT PRO-
GRAMME OF THE SLOVENIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE BANK OF SLOVENIA, PROGRAMME FOR
ERM II ENTRY AND ADOPTION OF THE EURO 23 (2003) [hereinafter SLOVENIAN ERM II
PROGRAM].
205. According to Solans, the accomplishment of the convergence criteria by new
Member States must be sustainable. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 121, OJ. C 325/
33; see also Protocol on Convergence Criteria, supra note 89, art. 1; Eugenio Domingo
Solans, Speech delivered at the Seventh Central European Covered Bond Conference,
Berlin, Oct. 12, 2003 (2003), available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2003/
html/sp031013.en.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2004) (Mr. Solans is a Member of the Gov-
erning Council and of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank). "The idea
of sustainability of nominal convergence goes hand in hand with the concept of real
convergence insofar as any excessive real divergence could compromise the sus-
tainability of nominal convergence." Solans, supra, at 7. Another officer of the Euro-
pean Central Bank, Christian Noyer, states that "advancing real and nominal conver-
gence with the Euro-area in a parallel manner should take top place on the agenda of
the new Member States' policy-makers." Christian Noyer, The ECB and the Accession
Process, Speech delivered at the European Federation of Finance House Association
(EUROFINAS) Conference, Oct. 15, 2001, at 4 (2001), available at http://www.ecb.int/
press/key/date/2001/html/sp011015.en.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004) (Mr. Noyer is
the Vice President of the European Central Bank). In addition, Duisenberg stresses
that:
[R] eal convergence mean [s] the broad adjustment through structural reforms
and economic development of the economies towards structures prevailing in
the EU. This requires, [inter alia], the completion of the market economy
transition agenda, further privatization in some sectors, and the strengthening
of the institutional and legal framework. Real convergence is seen as facilitat-
ing economic cohesion among Member States once they have joined EMU,
thereby helping to minimise the risk and effects of asymmetric shocks. Hence,
in order to enhance the process of real convergence as much as possible, ac-
cession countries should ensure that they make progress in the restructuring
of their economies and gradually align them with those of the [E]uro area.
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gence is seen as facilitating economic cohesion among Member
States once they join EMU, thereby helping to minimize the risk
and effect of asymmetric shock.20 6
The requirement for real convergence is composed of both
income and structural convergence. 0 7 Income convergence re-
lates mainly to per capita GDP and consumer prices, while struc-
tural convergence encompasses reform of the institutional
framework within which the economy operates. Real income
convergence and structural convergence are closely related.
Structural convergence and institutional reform can be viewed
as bases for a more favorable business environment and a more
efficient allocation of financial resources in the future.2 °8
B. Macroeconomic Policy Orientation
With accession to EU, the new Member States became sub-
ject to the EDP; and are therefore forced to adjust their fiscal
policies to its strict requirements. While new Member States
other than Malta and Cyprus do not face serious challenges in
Willem F. Duisenberg, The ECB and the Accession Process, Speech delivered at the
Frankfurt European Banking Congress, Nov. 23, 2001, at 2 (2001), available at http://
www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2001/html/spOlI123.en.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
Finally, Padoa-Schioppa advocates:
[T] hat real and nominal convergence should be pursued in parallel. Real con-
vergence is more than the catching up in income levels; it is the adjustment of
the real economies towards structures that allow the new Member States to
participate in a monetary union without contributing to, or suffering from,
significant asymmetric shocks. The level of per capita income is a useful, but
by no means always close, approximation of the relevant concept of real con-
vergence. Income levels in accession countries are still far below those of the
EU, to an extent never observed in previous EU enlargements.
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Accession Countries on the Way to the Euro, A central
Banker's View, Speech delivered to Conference on Economic Policy Directions in the
OECD Countries and Emerging Markets: Analyzing the Experiences, Warsaw, Poland,
Mar. 22, 2002, at 3 (2002), available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2002/html/
spO20322_l.en.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
206. See Duisenberg, supra note 205, at 2; see also Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 205,
at 3.
207. See Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 205, at 2.
208. The introduction of the real convergence as a requirement for adopting the
Euro was criticized by certain economists in the new Member States as a tool for addi-
tional discretion to delay the process of inclusion of new Member States in the Euro-
area. According to Lavrac, the real convergence is not precisely defined, which gives the
additional room for interpretation and discretion. See Vladimir Lavrac, Institutional As-
pects of Dynamics of Inclusion of Accession Countries into EMU, Ezoneplus Working
Paper No. 18, (2003), at 16, available at http://www.ezoneplus.org/archiv/ezp-wp-18.
pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
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adjusting their ratio of government debt,2"9 several have severe
problems with budget deficits. To meet the convergence criteria,
new Member States will have to consolidate and restructure the
income and spending sides of their budgets. 210 They will have to
pursue a gradual reduction of their budget deficits, and remain
conscious of the general situation in the international business
cycle. The new Member States' medium-term fiscal policy goal
should be to achieve a balanced budget with zero structural defi-
cits. A similar policy on structural deficit is planned for the
Euro-zone in the SGP.2 1 '
With regard to monetary policy and exchange rate strate-
212gies, most new Member States have already indicated their in-
tention to join EMU as early as possible after entry into EU.213
According to Padoa-Schioppa, the difficult task in implementing
the monetary and exchange rate strategies on the road toward
the Euro is to support the parallel pursuit of real and nominal
convergence. He further states that the ECB is not recom-
mending a particular monetary policy strategy to uniformly ap-
ply to all new Member States, but only recommends that main-
taining price stability remain the ultimate compass of monetary
209. Nevertheless, most countries expect a gradual reduction of the debt ratio, in
line with decreasing deficits. Major exceptions to this trend are the Czech Republic,
with a rise of the debt ratio of more than 10 percentage points between 2001 and 2005,
and Poland with a rise by seven percentage points. The projected development of pub-
lic debt particularly in these two countries gives rise to concern about the medium-term
debt dynamic and its impact on macroeconomic stability. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
ENLARGEMENT PAPERS No. 14, supra note 175, at 16.
210. The consolidation and restructuring of their budgets will probably represent
the most difficult and painful task for most new Member States when trying to fulfill the
economic convergence criteria. On the income side they will have to, among other
issues, cope with reduction of import duties and VAT due to accession to EU, while on
the spending side they will need to reduce the social transfers and cover the initial
accession costs. See id. at 13-15 (analyzing budget deficits of the new Member States).
211. See Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact,
supra note 116.
212. New Member States have a wide variety of exchange rate regimes, including:
independent floating (the Czech Republic and Poland); currency boards (Estonia and
Lithuania); managed floating - informally using the Euro as the reference currency -
(Slovakia and Slovenia); pegging to a basket of currencies with a greater (Malta) or
lesser (Latvia) weighing of the Euro; and, finally, pegging to the Euro within fluctuation
bands of± 15% (Cyprus and Hungary), a practice reminiscent of that used by the ERM
II. See DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH, supra note 202, at 33.
213. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ENLARGEMENT PAPERS No. 14, supra note 175, at
188 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:145
policy.214 This indicates, though, that an increasing orientation
toward the Euro would be in line with further economic and
financial integration with the Euro-area.215
As small, open economies, most new Member States cannot
disregard exchange rate developments when making their mon-
etary policy decisions. The exchange rate is generally a more
potent transmission channel of monetary policy decisions than
domestic interest rates and plays a crucial role in explaining the
pass-through to price developments in most accession coun-
tries. 216 Thus, in order to achieve further disinflation and sus-
tainable growth, excessive exchange rate fluctuations need to be
avoided.
In practice, a growing number of new Member States al-
ready follow exchange rate strategies that are in line with EMR II
requirements. Only a few will have to modify their policies to
make them compatible with ERM II membership.2 17 In addi-
tion, the Governing Council in its policy statement 218 indicated
that with regard to currency boards, the ECB does not consider
them to be a substitute for participation in ERM II. Thus, the
Governing Council implies that countries operating a currency
board will be required to participate in ERM II for at least two
years before the convergence assessment that is made prior to a
Member State's ability to adopt the Euro. However, Member
States that operate a sustainable Euro-based currency board
might not be required to go through a double regime shift (i.e.,
floating the currency within ERM II only to re-peg it to the Euro
at a later stage). Such countries may therefore participate in
ERM II with a currency board, enhancing the discipline within
ERM 11.219
In addition, and in order to achieve necessary restrictive
214. See Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 185, at 4; see also EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK,
POLICY POSITION, supra note 160, at 1-2.
215. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 2001, 109 (2001).
216. See Christian Noyer, Challenges Ahead: The Accession Process, Speech deliv-
ered at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, United Kingdom, Dec. 12,
2001, at 6 (2001), available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2001/html/
spO11112.en.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
217. See Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 185, at 5.
218. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, POLICY POSITION, supra note 160, at 3.
219. However, the ECB has stressed that such an arrangement will be assessed on a
case-by-case basis and that a common accord on the central parity against the Euro will
have to be reached. See id.
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monetary and fiscal policies, the new Member States will have to
proceed with structural reforms. 2 In this regard, a functioning
and stable financial sector is of vital importance. Further priva-
tization and restructuring of the enterprise sector will have to be
vigorously implemented. Completion of social security reform
and facilitation of labor market flexibility are also necessary to
achieve sustainable real convergence. -
C. Procedure to Join the Third Stage of EMU and Estimation of the
Time Schedule of the Fulfillment of the Convergence Criteria in the
New Member States
The new Member States that want to adopt the Euro as
quickly as possible must aim to fulfill the convergence test at the
earliest possible date. For this, they would need to enter the
ERM II as soon as they joined EU. An ideal time schedule based
on the wording of the convergence criteria could look as follows:
- May 1, 2004 Date of accession of the new Member States to
EU. Simultaneously, possible submission of the request for
membership in the ERM II. The earliest possible date of
ERM II entry is Monday, May 3, 2004.221 This is very unlikely
due to accession ceremonies. The next possible date is the
following Monday, May 10, 2004.222 This is possible but re-
quires detailed previous discussions between the new Mem-
ber States and the ECB, Commission and the Council;
2 2 3
- End of 2005 Since 2005 budget will be the last before exami-
nation in 2006, the new Member States have to comply with
criteria on budget deficit and public debt by the end of
2005;
- April 2006 The Convergence Reports should be published
in 2006, according to the E.C. Treaty. In order to be as-
sessed in the 2006 Convergence Reports, the new Member
State must comply with budgetary, inflationary, interest rate
220. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ENLARGEMENT PAPERS No. 14, supra note 175, at
18-22.
221. In such a case the decision of joining the ERM II in accordance with the
formal procedure as described above should take place during the weekend of May 1-2,
2004.
222. The day of entry to ERM II has so far always been Monday. See Zogala, supra
note 180, at 49.
223. See SLOVENIAN ERM II PROGRAM, supra note 204, at 57-75 (providing detailed
time schedule regarding the technical issues in connection with adoption of Euro).
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convergence criteria.2 2 4 If the same timing as in 2002 is ap-
plied to the 2006 Convergence Reports, a new Member
State will miss by just days the full two-year duration of the
ERM II participation required. If the participation in the
ERM II proceeds smoothly (without devaluation or "severe
tensions"), there should be no reason to deny a finding of
fulfillment of the exchange rate criterion;
- May 9, 2006 If the new Member States enter the ERM II on
May 10, 2004, the two-year test period for the exchange-rate
criterion ends on May 9, 2006;
- May -June 2006 Assuming that the participation in ERM II
proceeds smoothly, budgetary criterion is fulfilled by the
end of 2005, and the inflation and interest rate criteria are
fulfilled in April 2006 at the latest, the Commission and the
ECB should conclude in their Convergence Reports that a
new Member State fulfills the requirements of the E.C.
Treaty. 225 Both reports will then be submitted to the Coun-
cil. Next, the European Commission will prepare a propo-
sal for those Member States whose derogation is to be abro-
gated. The European Parliament will be consulted and
then the Council (in its composition as Heads of States or
Governments) will discuss the issues. The last step of the
procedure is the meeting of the ECOFIN Council. The
Council, acting by a qualified majority, will decide which
Member States with derogation fulfill the necessary condi-
tions and whose derogation is to be abrogated. The Coun-
cil will also decide on the date of EMU entry and the con-
version rate. The ECOFIN Council could make its decision
before the June 2004 European Council meeting.2 26
- January 1, 2007227 Entry in third stage of EMU and adop-
tion of the Euro as official currency. The central bank gov-
224. Last Convergence Reports published in 2002, were prepared in May and ex-
amined the period up to end April 2002. In accordance with Article 122(2), the Mem-
ber State can also require from the ECB and the Commission to prepare the Conver-
gence Report. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 122(2), O.J. C 325/33.
225. For purposes of clarity of this timeline, there is deliberate negligence of the
issue of sustainable real convergence.
226. According to Zogala, this would be "politically correct" and will give the Euro-
pean Council the possibility to officially "welcome the decision of the Council." See
Zogala, supra note 180, at 49.
227. The entry date has so far always been January 1. This was the date of the start
of the third stage EMU in 1999 and the date of Greece's entry in 2001. This is reasona-
ble, because the easiest way to deal with the various consequences of the change of the
currency is the end of year. However, this is not a prescribed rule, and the Council
could set another date, if it considers it appropriate.
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ernor of each new EMU country becomes a member of the
Governing Council, the main decision-making body, of the
ECB.
This timetable, however, has already proven to be unrealis-
tic. No new Member State entered the ERM II on May 10, 2004.
The first new Member States to enter the ERM II were Estonia,
Lithuania, and Slovenia on June 27, 2004. Consequently, these
three countries, although in the best position among the new
Member States to adopt the Euro, are already almost two months
behind the above time table. Moreover, the available data show
that the possibility that any of the new Member States will fulfill
the nominal convergence criteria and achieve sustainable real
convergence to the degree required by Commission and ECB is
not very high. Therefore, a more realistic scenario is adoption
of the Euro by the first new Member States on January 1, 2008 or
even 2009.
It appears therefore that the first new Member States to
adopt the Euro will come from the group of small countries with
managed budget deficits, most probably one of the Baltic coun-
tries. If sustainable real convergence is the deciding factor, Slo-
venia may be the first. Its real convergence is comparatively ad-
vanced 228 and it has achieved good results in meeting the infla-
tion rate criterion.229
It would be very surprising if one of the three largest of the
new Member States - the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland
- would be among the first new Member States to adopt the
Euro. Absent strong political pressures, the most reasonable ap-
proach is to begin with a small, open economy. When testing
how a transitional economy will function in and influence the
operation of EMU, damage control on both sides should defi-
nitely be considered.
A cautious approach, as strongly advocated by the senior
ECB officials, seems in place. Nevertheless, the adoption of the
Euro is not only an extremely important instrument for further
integration of the new Member State economies into EU, but
also carries a strong emotional value for the citizens of the new
Member States. For ordinary people single currency is one of
228. ALEs DELAKORDA, IZPOLNJEVANJE EKONOMSKIH KRITERIJEV CLANSTVA SLOVENIJE V
EU IN EMU, BANKA SLOVENUE, PRIKAZI IN ANALIZE XI 1 (2003) (on file with author).
229. See SLOVENIAN ERM II PROGRAM, supra note 204, at 24.
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the most visible and useful attributes of relatively detached EU
structures. A strong Euro could consequently play a significant
role in the long-term satisfaction of citizens of the new Member
States. It is therefore of vital importance for the future of Euro-
pean integration that new Member States adopt the Euro as
soon as possible.
